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Articles

FIXING THE CONSTITUTIONAL
ABSURDITY OF THE APPORTIONMENT
OF DIRECT TAX
Calvin H. Johnson*
The Constitution requires that direct taxes be apportioned
among the states according to population. 1 Before the abolition
* Professor Law, University of Texas. A table of short form citations to frequently cited documentary sources is found in the Appendix.
1. The Constitution of the United States provides:
Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned among the several
States ... according to their respective Numbers, which shall be determined by
adding to the whole Number of free Persons, including those bound to Service
for a Term of Years, and excluding Indians not taxed, (but including] threefifths of all other Persons. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.
The three-fifths of "all other Persons" referred to slaves, but the Thirteenth Amendment
abolished slavery.
See also U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 9, cl. 4 (providing that "[n]o Capitation, or other direct,
Tax shall be laid, unless in Proportion to the Census or Enumeration herein before directed to be taken").
Recent contributions to the literature in favor of application of apportionment include OWEN M. FISS, TROUBLED BEGINNINGS OF THE MODERN STATE, 1888-1910 49,
92-93 (1993) (praising the application of apportionment to render taxation impossible
except possibly in time of war); Erik M. Jensen, The Apportionment of "Direct Taxes":
Are Consumption Taxes Constitutional?, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2334 (1997) (arguing that
consumption taxes, except sales tax, would need to be apportioned); Erik M. Jensen, The
Taxing Power, the Sixteenth Amendment, and the Meaning of "Incomes," 33 ARIZ. ST.
L.J. 1057 (2001) reprinted as shortened, 97 TAX NOTES 99 (2002) (arguing that apportionment should not be avoided by judicial construction of word "income"); Erik M. Jensen, The Constitwion Matters in Tax, 100 TAX NOTES 821 (2003) (urging that we take the
apportionment clause seriously and claiming that all taxes except income taxes and taxes
resembling sales taxes must be apportioned).
Recent contributions that seek to avoid apportionment include Bruce Ackerman,
Taxation and the Constitution, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1999) (arguing that the Sixteenth
Amendment enables Congress and not the courts to decide what to tax); Marjorie Kornhauser, The Constitwional Meaning of Income and the Taxation of Gifts, 25 CONN. L.
REV. 1 (1992) (arguing that "income" within the meaning of the Sixteenth Amendment is
inherently malleable); Lawrence Zelenak, Radical Reform, the Constitution, and the Conscientious Legislator, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 833 (1999) (arguing that current proposals for
federal consumption tax can be considered either as income taxes or as not direct taxes).
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of slavery, the formula for apportionment counted each slave as
three-fifths of a free person. Indeed, apportionment of tax was
brought into the Constitution to impose a disincentive on slavery. An apportioned or direct tax is like a requisition from a
state with each state having a quota to satisfy, except that the
Congress determines the objects and rates of tax and collects the
state quota directly from individuals. Apportionment requires
that federal tax rates must vary among the states so that two
states with the same population, counting slaves as required, will
have the same tax payment.
Apportionment of tax among the states by population turns
out to be an absurd requirement, almost always impossible or
else so perverse in effect that no democracy, indeed no rational
government, could adopt it. Apportionment by population preys
upon poor states, requiring tax rates to be highest where the tax
base is thinnest. Apportionment by state can force an entire
state's quota to fall upon a few taxpayers, perhaps upon a single
innocent taxpayer. We now know that the drafters of the Constitution did not see the perversities. The framers said kind things
about apportionment of tax that are impossible to reconcile with
its unavoidable effects.
The apportionment clause has had an accidental but venomous effect on federal tax policy over the years. The Sixteenth
Amendment to the Constitution now allows a federal income tax
without apportionment among the states. Apportionment, however, threatens to make a tax unconstitutional if Congress strays
beyond some narrow and silly definition of "income." Basing
federal income tax on "unrealized" changes in fair market value,
for instance, is probably the only way to solve some very knotty
problems in tax policy and to minimize the damage that taxation
does to the economy. 2 It is argued, however, that a tax on unreI have argued that apportionment is not required whenever it is unreasonable. See Calvin H. Johnson, Purging ow Pollock: The Constitutionality of Federal Wealth or Sales Taxes,
97 TAX NoTES 1723 (2002); Calvin H. Johnson, Apportionment of Direct Taxes: The Foulup in the Core of the Constillltion, 7 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1 (1998) shortened version
reprinted in, The CollStitwional Meaning of "Apportionment of Direct Taxes," 80 TAX
NOTES 591 (Aug. 3, 1998), reprinted 15 STATE TAX NOTES 413 (Aug. 17, 1998).
2. For serious arguments that tax without realization would improve the tax system in various contexts, see, for example, Alvin C. Warren, Jr., Financial Contract Innovation and Income Tax Policy, 107 HARV. L. REV. 460, 474 (1993); Mark P. Gergen &
Paula Schmitz, The Influence of Tax Law on Securities Innovation in the United States:
1981-1997, 52 TAX L. REV. 119, 124 (1998); Jeff Strnad, Periodicity and Accretion Taxation: Norms and Implementation, 99 YALE L.J. 1817, 1821 (1990); Joseph Dodge, A
Combined Mark-to-Market and Pass-Through Corporate-Shareholder Integration Proposal, 50 TAX L. REV. 265 (1995).
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alized amounts is not constitutional because unrealized amounts
are not income under the Sixteenth Amendment and because
tax on unrealized amounts is a direct tax that fails because it
cannot be apportioned. 3 There have been calls from the right for
replacing federal income tax with a national consumption tax or
sales tax 4 and calls from the left for enacting a federal wealth
tax. 5 Apportionment is said to cast vetoes in both directions. 6
Depending on your politics, the killing effect of apportionment is
sometimes a tragedy and sometimes a lucky strike. Still, none of
it has anything to do with the values and purposes that created
the constitutional requirement-or with rational tax policy. The
killing effect in random directions cannot be consistently or coherently right.
This article argues that nothing in the original meaning of
apportionment justifies treating apportionment as a barrier to
any federal tax. Apportionment was brought into the Constitution, in the midst of a debate about determining representation
in Congress, so as to discourage the South from acquiring more
slaves. The critical aspect, originally, was that slaves would be
included in the count at three-fifths. "Direct tax" in 1787 was a
synonym for "apportioned tax," and the meaning of the term
varied according to whether the tax was apportioned at the federal level. The best understanding of the original bargain, accordingly, is that the mandatory remedy was not that any taxes
should be apportioned, but rather that the slaves had to be included in the calculation of Southern taxes, counted at threefifths, should Congress choose to apportion a tax. There is no
evidence in the original debates that anyone, whether in favor of

3. See Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 206 (1920) (invalidating a federal tax on
stock dividends because stock dividends were not income within the meaning of the Sixteenth Amendment); Leon Gabinet & Ronald J. Coffey, The Implications of the Economic Concept of Income for Corporation-Shareholder Income Tax Systems, 27 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 895,926 (1977) (arguing that apportionment prevents a shareholder tax on
undistributed corporate earnings); JohnS. Nolan, The Merit In Conformity of Tax to Financial Accounting, 50 TAXES 761, 767-69 (1972) (arguing that prepaid receipts are not
taxable under the Constitution); Henry Ordower, Revisiting Realization: Accretion Taxation, the Constitution, Macomber, and Mark to Market, 13 VA. TAX REV. 1 (1993) (arguing that economic improvements achieved while avoiding incoming cash cannot be constitutionally taxed as income).
4. See, e.g., J.C.S. 18-95, 104'h Cong. (1st Sess. 1995) (Joint Committee on Taxation's "Description and Analysis of Proposals to Replace the Federal Income Tax" from
June 5, 1995).
5. See, e.g., BRUCE A. ACKERMAN & ANNE ALSTOIT, THE STAKEHOLDER
SOCIETY (1999) (advocating a capital grant to young adults, funded by a federal wealth
tax).
6. Jensen, The Taxing Power, supra note 1, at 1057.
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or opposed to federal direct tax, thought of apportionment as
preventing any federal tax. For better or worse, both proponents
and opponents of the Constitution called the power to lay direct
taxes "unrestricted." The grand purpose of the Constitution was
to give Congress such tax powers as necessary to pay Revolutionary War debts. A serious restraint on tax in that context
would have been unthinkable.
When the Constitution was young and flexible, the Supreme
Court, still composed of Founders, avoided the nonsense of apportionment by interpretation. The Supreme Court held in Hylton v. United States 1 in 1796 that where apportionment was unreasonable, the tax was therefore not "direct." That wise
interpretation survived for 100 years and justified federal tax, for
instance, on income, corporate capital, and estates.
In 1895, however, Pollock came into the garden. By a margin of five to four, Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust 8 overruled
the Hylton line of cases and used the apportionment requirement to strike down a federal income tax. Pollock concocted a
history and rationale for apportionment that was the opposite of
the original meaning. Apportionment arose to reach the wealth
of the states, using numbers as a measure of wealth, but Pollock
supposed that apportionment must have been intended to protect wealth and wealthy states from assault by mere numbers.
Pollock is a model of bad judicial behavior. The majority Justices used apportionment as a convenient excuse to kill a federal
tax that the Justices disliked for private political reasons. Their
interpretation displayed their ignorance of the true historical rationale. Shallow readings of constitutional text are dangerous
things in willful or ignorant hands.
Pollock was wrongly decided at the time and elite opinion
soon turned against it. The Supreme Court began to limit the
case to its facts, stretching the term "excise tax" to avoid apportionment whenever the requirement was suggested. The nation
as a whole then reversed Pollock on its facts by overwhelmingly
enacting the Sixteenth Amendment, which allowed an income
tax without apportionment among the states.
It is time now to overrule Pollock in full and to return to
Hylton. Pollock can be and has been contained by manipulative
definition of "excise tax" or "income" so that the case is avoidable in every instance. Pollock is dead on its holding as to the in7.
8.

3 U.S. 171 (1796).
157 U.S. 429 (1895), vacated by 158 U.S. 601 (1895).
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come tax. Indeed, courts have a duty to distinguish Pollock in
every case. Apportionment is too awful a requirement to enforce. Since Pollock should never apply, it should be overruled
outright. A full reversal of Pollock would eliminate apportionment as a constraint on contemporary federal tax policy. "Income" could then be defined sensibly by Congress. Congress
could replace or supplement the income tax with some other tax
as it wishes. Apportionment would never threaten any federal
tax. Congress would then decide the issues of tax policy by the
ordinary process of democracy, unhindered by an absurd requirement.
Professors William Eskridge and Sandy Levinson recently
collected essays on constitutional stupidities and tragedies. 9 They
asked various authors to identify the worst feature of the United
States Constitution. Apportionment of direct tax is a profound
stupidity. Although slavery, at least, is worse, apportionment of
direct tax is a constitutional stupidity that we can eliminate without a civil war. Through proper constitutional interpretation, we
can sure that apportionment of tax will never again be a tragedy.
I. THE ORIGINAL MEANING OF THE
APPORTIONMENT REQUIREMENT
Article I, section 8 of the Constitution gives Congress the
power to lay and collect taxes in order "to pay the Debts and
provide for the common Defense and general Welfare." 10 The
apportionment requirement is found in article I, section 2, which
requires that both representation in the House of Representatives of the Congress and "direct taxes" shall be apportioned
among the states according to their respective numbers. Section
2 further requires that the states' numbers be determined by
adding the whole number of free persons and three-fifths of all
slaves. 11 Section 9 repeats the requirement by saying that no
capitation or other direct tax shall be laid unless in proportion to
12
the census. Section 9 also prohibits any tax on exports from the

9. CONSTITUTIONAL STUPIDITIES, CONSTITUTIONAL TRAGEDIES (William N.
Eskridge, Jr. & Sanford Levinson eds., 1998).
10. U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 8, cl. 1.
11. U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 2, cl. 3. The text refers to the slaves by the euphemistic "all
other Pe~ons," but "all other Persons" was understood to refer to the slaves. See, e.g.,
Rufus Kmg, Speech to the Massachusetts Ratification Convention (Jan. 17, 1788) in 2
ELLIOT'S DEBATES 36.
12. U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 9, d. 4.
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states. 13 Section 8 requires that all duties, imposts, and excises be
uniform in rate throughout the United States. 14 "Direct tax" is
not defined, but an apportioned tax cannot have a uniform rate
in every state, absent impossible assumptions. We can deduce
therefore that the taxes for which a uniform rate is requiredduties, excises, and imposts-cannot be direct taxes. "Impost"
was a reference to a tax on imports, now more commonly called
"tariffs" or "custom duties. " 1 "Duty" was apparently a reference to a stamp tax on legal documents. 16 "Excise tax" referred,
originally but not exclusively, to tax on whiskey. 17 The original
Constitution has been amended, first, to end slavery. 18 The Sixteenth Amendment, ratified in 1913, allows Congress to impose
a tax on income from whatever source derived, without apportionment among the states. 19 In sum, a tax is constitutional if is
apportioned among the state, except for export taxes. Even if
not apportioned, a tax is constitutional if the tax is a duty, excise,
impost, or income tax.
A. VOTING BY WEALTH
1. Population as a Measure Of Wealth
The rule that tax be apportioned among the states according
to population was introduced during the debates at the Philadelphia Constitutional Convention over the allocation of votes in
the national legislature. Population, counting slaves at threefifths, was consistently understood as a measure of wealth. The
apportionment formula was intended to allocate votes in Congress according to the comparative wealth of the states.
At the time of the Convention, there was still ambiguity as
to whether the government should represent people or property.
Pierce Butler, delegate from South Carolina, argued, for instance, that wealth was the only just measure of representation,
13. U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 9, d. 5.
14. U.S. CaNST. art. I,§ 8, d. 1.
15. In 1783, Congress had proposed, unsuccessfully, that the federal government be
allowed to impose a 5% "impost," which was a tax on imports. April 18, 1783, 24 J.
CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 257 (1783).
16. See Luther Martin, "Genuine Information," Maryland Legislature (Nov. 29,
1787), in 3 FARRAND'S RECORDS 203 (saying that "duty" referred to stamps on documents, but that the phrase "stamp tax" was avoided because of the association with the
British stamp tax, which had been one of the causes of the Revolution).
17. See infra note 128.
18. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
19. U.S. CONST. amend. XVI.
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because property was the "the great object of Govern[men]t"
and "the great means of carrying ... on" war. 20 Delegates who
wanted votes also to represent IJeople were nonetheless willing
to give "due weight" to wealth. 21 Voting weight should be accorded to wealth, The Federalist stated, because "[g]overnment
is instituted no less for protection of the property, than of ... individuals."22 Even delegates who wanted to include people in determining representation argued in terms of the contribution of
people to war, rather than counting people for their own sake.
Gouverneur Morris of Pennsylvania argued, for example, that
while the South would provide wealth in war, the Northern
states would "spill their blood." 23
Some delegates favored determining votes only by population. James Wilson of Pennsylvania consistently opposed votes
based on property, arguing that the people were the fountain
from which all authority is derived. "[T]he supreme power resides in the people," he told the Penns.7lvania Ratification Convention, "and they never part with it."2 Wilson was the best representative of the democratic norms that prevail today, but it is
not clear that he would have prevailed had the issue been decided directly at the Convention. The Virginia Plan, which was
offered at the beginning of the Convention and set the agenda
for subsequent debates, provided, ambiguously, that "the rights
of suffrage in the [n]ational [l]egislature ought to be proportioned to the quotas of contribution [i.e., by tax paid], or to the
number of free inhabitants, as the one or the other rule may
seem best in different cases. "25 Madison, the primary author of
20. Pierce Butler, Speech to the Federal Convention (July 6, 1787), in 1
FARRAND'S RECORDS 540,542. See also Pierce Butler, Speeches to the Federal Convention (July 9, 1787), in 1 FARRAND'S RECORDS 559, 562 ("warmly" urging the necessity of
regarding the wealth in the determination of representation) and (July 11, 1787), in 1
FARRAND'S RECORDS 580 (calling for counting 100% of slaves in representation of a
state because slave in South Carolina contributed as much to wealth as a freeman in
M assach use tts).
21. Charles Pinckey (S.C.), Speech to the Federal Convention (July 10, 1787), in 1
FARRAND'S RECORDS 566 (dwelling on the superior wealth of the Southern States, and
insisted on its having its due weight in the Government); John Rutledge, Speech to the
Federal Convention (July 11, 1787), in 2 FARRAND'S RECORDS 582 (calling for the admission of wealth in the estimate by which representation is determined).
22. THE FEDERALIST No. 54, at 278 (Alexander Hamilton or James Madison)
(Feb. 12, 1788).
23. Governeur Morris, Speech to the Federal Convention (July 10, 1787), in 1
FARRAND'S RECORDS 366.
24. James Wilson, Speech before the Pennsylvania Ratification Convention (Oct. 6,
1787), in 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES 433.
25. Records of the Federal Convention (May 30, 1787) in 1 FARRAND's RECORDS
35.
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the Virginia Plan, ducked the great question of whether the government should represent people or wealth.
The delegates who drafted the Constitution avoided the need
to resolve whether government represented property or people
because they could not measure property except by measuring
people. Under the Articles of Confederation, Congress had been
able to raise funds only by requisitions upon the states, and the
Articles determined each state's quota under the requisition according to the value of land and imRrovements within each state,
estimated as Congress might direct. 6 Determining quotas according to value proved unworkable because Congress had neither
employees nor means of estimating value and because the states
cheated. Pennsylvania, the Southern delegates complained, had
submitted appraisals of its land that placed Pennsylvania's quota
at half the size of Virginia's, when, the South thought, Pennsylvania should have reported a quota equal to Virginia's. 27 Because
Congress was never able to ascertain the value of surveyed lands
and improvements,28 all quotas were provisional, to be adjusted
later. To avoid appraisals, Congress in 1783 proposed that requisitions be apportioned among the states according to population,
counting slaves at three-fifths. 29 This formula was brought over
into the Constitution to determine first votes and then taxes. The
1783 proposal was never ratified because the Articles of Confederation required unanimity for amendment and two states, New
York and New Hampshire, refused to ratify the package. 30 The
1783 formula was considered legitimate in the constitutional de-

26. Articles of Confederation, art. VIII. March 1, 1781,19 JCC217 (1781).
27. Report of the North Carolina Congressional Delegates to Governor Alexander
Martin (March 24, 1783), in 20 LETTERS OF DELEGATES 90.
28. Rufus King, Speech to the Massachusetts Ratification Convention (Jan. 17,
1788) in 3 FARRAND's RECORDS 255 (saying that apportionment under the Confederation was according to surveyed lands and improvements, which Congress could never
ascertain).
29. The 1783 proposal provided that contributions to the congressional treasury
shall be supplied by the states "in proportion to the whole number of white and other
free citizens and inhabitants, of every age, sex and condition, including those bound to
servitude for a term of years, and three-fifths of all other persons not comprehended in
the foregoing description, except Indians, not paying taxes, in each State." Apri/18, 1783,
24 JCC 260 (1783). When the language was transferred to the Constitution, art. I, § 2, the
reference to "white and other free citizens" became simply a reference to "free citizens."
The quoted language is otherwise the same.
30. John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino, Editorial Note 18, in 9 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY 1174. New York vetoed the 1783 proposal because it would give the federal government the 5% impost or tariff and would preempt the state tax that New York imposed on imports through New York harbor. See JOHN P. KAMINSKI, GEORGE CLINTON:
YEOMAN POLITICIAN OF THE NEW REPUBLIC 89-96 (1993).
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bates, however, in part because it had been ratified by eleven of
the thirteen states?
Apportionment by population was treated in the debates as
merely a measure of wealth when no other measure was feasible.
As John Adams explained in 1776, "the numbers of people were
taken ... as an index of the wealth of the state & not as subjects
of taxation. "32 Samuel Chase, later a Justice participating in Hylton, argued that given the difficulty of land valuations, the number of inhabitants within a state was a "tolerably good criteri[on]
of wealth." 33 James Wilson, who served with Chase on the Hylton Court, reported consistently that in apportioning tax in
Pennsylvania between Philadelphia and the west, it did not matter whether population or wealth was used. 34 Consistently, Nathaniel Ghorum told the Convention that he had seen the tax estimates in Massachusetts and that it made no difference in
allocation of state tax between Boston and the rest of the state
whether population or property was used because "the most exact proportion prevailed between numbers & property." 35 James
Madison summed up the argument by saying that although
population was not strictly a measure of wealth, the correlation
was sufficient. As long as labor could move with ease and freedom, Madison argued, labor would find its level in different
places, so that labor would always be a measure of comparative
wealth. 36 "[T]he population and fertility in any tract of country,"
said Landholder in Connecticut, "will be proportional to each
other." 37 "If the Legislature were to be governed by wealth,"
said Roger Sherman, "they would be obliged to estimate it by
numbers." 38 "Wealth and population were the true, equitable
31. See, e.g., James Wilson (Pa.), Speech to the Federal Convention (June 11, 1787)
in 1 FARRAND'S RECORDS 201 (saying that counting slaves at three-fifths for tax had
been adopted by all states but New Hampshire and Rhode Island); William Paterson
(N.J.) and Rufus King (Mass.), Speeches to the Federal Convention (July 9, 1787) in
FARRAND'S RECORDS 561-562 (accord); Rufus King, Speech to the Massachusetts Ratification Convention (Jan. 17, 1788) in 3 FARRAND'S RECORDS 255 (accord).
32. John Adams (Mass.), Debate in the Continental Congress, July 12, 1776, in 4
LEITERS OF DELEGATES 439.
33. Samuel Chase (Md.), July 12, 1776, in 4 LEITERS OF DELEGATES 438.
34. James Wilson, Speech to the Federal Convention (July 11, 1787) in 2
FARRAND'S RECORDS 587-588.
35. /d. at 587.
36. /d. at 585-86. See also id. at 579 (George Mason's speech to the Federal Convention); id. at 582 (Rufus King arguing that there was great force in the objections that
numbers do not measure wealth, but acceding to the proposition for the sake of doing
something).
37. Landholder, Letter XI, CONN. COURANT (March 10, 1788), reprinted in 16
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 368.
38. Roger Sherman, Speech to the Federal Convention (July 11, 1787) in 2
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rule[s] of representation," William Samuel Johnson of Connecticut concluded, "but ... these two principles resolved themselves
into one; population being the best measure of wealth. " 39 The
delegates also explained at home that the formula for apportionment was intended as an approximate measure of wealth. 40
The delegates did not necessarily think that population was truly
an accurate measure of wealth, but using population to measure
wealth avoided a deadlock over whether wealth or population
should govern votes in principle, and they also had no other
more accurate measure. They, accordingly, convinced themselves that the population was an adequate measure of wealth.
Counting slaves at three-fifths was always a measurement of
slaves' contribution to the wealth of the states. The controversy
over slaves' contribution started in 1776 in the first debates over
allocations of requisitions. The South argued that slaves should
be excluded from population because slaves were an investment,
like cattle or horses. 41 The North argued that slaves should be
counted in full because slaves added wealth as much as free labor.42 The South countered that slaves be counted at half because that ratio reflected the relative price of free and slave labor. 43 Both sides eventually compromised at three-fifths in 1783
FARRAND'S RECORDS 582.
39. William Samuel Johnson, Speech to the Federal Convention (July 12, 1787) in 2
FARRAND'S RECORDS 593.
40. Charles Pinckney, Speech in South Carolina House of Representatives (Jan,
1788) in 3 FARRAND'S RECORDS 253 (saying that we were at a loss for a rule to ascertain
the proportionate wealth of the states and at last thought that the productive labor of the
inhabitants was the best rule for ascertaining their wealth, counting the whole number of
free persons plus three fifths of the slaves); Rufus King, Speech to the Massachusetts
Ratification Convention (Jan. 17, 1788) in 3 FARRAND'S RECORDS 255 (explaining apportionment of votes and taxes as arising because Congress could never ascertain value
of surveyed lands and improvements); William Davie, Speech to the North Carolina
Ratification Convention (July 24, 1788) in 4 ELLIOT'S DEBATES 31 (representation was
attempted from a compound ratio of wealth and population, but it was found impracticable to determine the comparative value of lands and other property, in so extensive a
territory; and population alone was adopted as the only practicable rule or criterion of
representation; slaves were represented because their labor contributed to general
wealth).
41. Samuel Chase (Md.), Debate in the Continental Congress, July 12, 1776, in 4
LETTERS OF DELEGATES 439.
42. John Adams (Mass.), Debate in the Continental Congress, July 12, 1776, in 4
LETTERS OF DELEGATES 439-40 (saying that ten laborers add as much wealth annually
to the state, whether they are called freemen or slaves); James Wilson (Pa.), July 12,
1776, in 4 LETTERS OF DELEGATES 439 (saying "[d]ismiss your slaves & freemen will
take their places").
43. Benjamin Harrison (Va.), July 12, 1776, in 4 LETTERS OF DELEGATES 440. In
the 1783 proposal to move from appraisals of real estate to population, the South was
willing to count slaves at one-half. Edward Clarke (N.J.), March 27, 1783, 25 JCC 947
(1783) (debates in the Continental Congress); Report of the North Carolina Congres-
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by reason of the necessity of abandoning the valuation-of-realestate system and, it was said, "by a despair on both sides" for a
rate for slaves more favorable to their side. 44 The ratio reached
by such a hard-fought compromise in 1783 was treated as legitimate in 1787.
Population, including slaves at three-fifths, originally entered the Constitution solely as a rule for allocating votes in the
national legislature. On June 11, 1787, the Convention voted
nine states to two in favor of apportioning votes in the national
legislature by population, including slaves at three-fifths. 45 Only
New Jersey and Delaware voted against the proposition. These
small states were holding out for a rule that each state should
have equal voting power without regard to wealth or population.
The June 11 vote was nonbinding because the Convention was
meeting as a "Committee of the Whole" to facilitate discussion,
but the vote displays the consensus of the Convention. 46
The apparent consensus in favor of allocating votes counting slaves at three-fifths fell apart, however, on July 11, 1787. A
committee that had met in secret reported a plan for votes without explaining the principle underlying the allocation. The committee report seemed acceptable to no one. The South Carolina
delegates, Pierce Butler and Charles Pinckey, demanded that
slaves be counted in full in determining votes, 47 and the Northern states countered that slaves would not be counted at all.
Governeur Morris of Pennsylvania said that he would never
agree to give such encouragement to the slave trade as would be

sional Delegates to Governor Alexander Martin, March 24, 1783, in 20 LEITERS OF
DELEGATES 90-91.
44. Madison's Notes on Debate in the Continental Congress (April 1, 1783) in 20
LEITERS OF DELEGATES 128.
45. Motion in a Committee of the Whole (June 11, 1787) in 1 FARRAND'S
RECORDS 201.
46. See also "Report of a Grand Committee" (consisting of one delegate from each
state and chaired by Benjamin Franklin) (July 5, 1787) in 1 FARRAND'S RECORDS 526
(recommending that proportion of votes in the House of Representatives (but not tax)
be determined by population, counting slaves at three fifths).
47. Pierce Butler (S.C.), Speech to the Federal Convention (July 11, 1787) in 1
FARRAND's RECORDS 580 (saying that slaves contributed as much to wealth as a freeman and that wealth was the great means of defence and utility to the nation); Charles
Pmckney (S.C.), Speech to the Federal Convention (July 12, 1787) in 1 FARRAND's
RECORDS 596 (arguing that slaves were as productive of wealth as were labourers in the
North). Pierce Butler's motion to include slaves in full in votes lost 3 states to 7 (July 11,
1787). ld at 581. Pinckney's motion to include slaves in full in both tax and votes lost 2
states to 8 (July 12, 1787). !d. at 596.
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given by allowing the Southern states to gain representation for
their slaves. 48 He later explained,
The admission of slaves into the Representation ... comes to
this: that the inhabitant of Georgia and S. C. who goes to the
Coast of Africa, and in defiance of the most sacred laws of
humanity tears away his fellow creatures from their dearest
connections & dam[ n ]s them to the most cruel bandages, shall
[thereby] have more votes in a Govt. instituted for protection
49
of the rights of mankind.

With the new stalemate over slavery, the motion to count slaves
at three-fifths was defeated 4-6 on July 11, although it had
passed overwhelmingly in June. All the Northern states except
Connecticut voted against including slaves at three-fifths. 50 All of
the Southern states voted in favor of counting slaves at threefifths, except South Carolina, which apparently was holding out
for counting slaves in full.
2. Taxing slavery
Apportionment of tax according to population came into
the Constitution because it apportioned tax to the slave states
counting slaves at three-fifths. The tax on slaves served to bridge
the stalemate of July 11, over how to count slaves for purposes
of representation. Counting three-fifths of the slave population
for purposes of apportioning taxes was intended to reduce the
South's incentive to add slaves. Once the South was taxed more
for more slaves, the North could retreat from its stance of July
11 and return to its position of June 11, acceding to the inclusion
of slaves in the determination of votes.

48. Governeur Morris, Speech to the Federal Convention (July 11, 1787) in 1
FARRAND'S RECORDS 588.
49. Governeur Morris, Speech to the Federal Convention (Aug. 8, 1787) in 2
FARRAND'S RECORDS 222. Morris' complaint came in the debate over banning the slave
trade, after the taxation of slaves in apportionment of direct tax had been settled, indicating that his irritation at including slaves in representation had not been fully assuaged by
his tax proposal. See also Rufus King, id at 220 (strenuously objecting to including slavery
in representation if importation of slaves were not limited).
50. 1 FARRAND'S RECORDS 588. Madison's notes say that the count was 6 in favor,
and 4 against, but he lists each state and tallying those states the vote is 4-6 against and
context makes clear the motion failed.
Connecticut delegates seem to have been the most tolerant of slavery in the North,
for reasons idiosyncratic to the delegates. See Oliver Ellsworth (Conn.), Aug. 22, 1787, 2
FARRAND'S RECORDS 371 (North should not intermeddle in slavery); Roger Sherman
(Conn.), id., at 369-379 (urging that the Convention should "leave the matter [of slavery]
as we find it" and "despatch [to our] business").
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At the start of the debates on July 12, Governor Morris
moved that taxes as well as votes in the national legislature be
allocated according to population, including slaves at threefifths? Morris's motion to include slaves for taxes met his own
objection the day before that including slaves for votes would
encourage enslavement of Africans. Counting slaves for representation would make it in the interest of the South to continue
the infamous traffic in slaves, Luther Martin would later explain,
whereas apportioning tax by slaves would discourage slavery. 52
The North was asking for only a public relations ploy to get back
to its June 11 position. The North would take less umbrage at
counting slaves for representation, said Wilson of Pennsylvania,
if the rule could be presented strategically first as rule of taxation and only indirectly as a rule on voting. 53
Morris's initial motion would have made all taxes subject to
apportionment by population, counting slaves at three-fifths.
George Mason of Virginia objected that apportioning all taxes
would drive Congress to requisitions, and James Wilson objected
that he could not understand how apportionment could be performed unless restricted to direct taxation. 54 In Wilson's mind,
direct taxes were those that could feasibly be apportioned. Morris responded by amending his motion so that apportionment
would be required only for direct tax. 55 Apportionment of tax
changed enough votes in the North, so that by the end of the
day, apportionment of both direct taxes and votes in the national
legislature by population with slaves counted at three-fifths
passed by a margin of 6-2 with two other states divided. 5 6
51. 1 FARRAND'S RECORDS at 591-592.
52. Luther Martin, "Genuine Information," Maryland Legislature (Nov. 29, 1787)
in 3 FARRAND'S RECORDS 197.
53. James Wilson, July 12, 1787, 1 FARRAND'S RECORDS 595. See also Gouverneur
Morris, Speech to the Federal Convention (Sept. 13, 1788) in 2 FARRAND'S RECORDS
608 (saying that apportionment of direct tax was adopted in order allow Negroes to be
re-ferred to as the objects of direct tax, and only incidentally to be counted in representation).
54. James Wilson, Speech to the Federal Convention, July 12, 1787, 1 FARRAND'S
RECORDS 592.
55. /d. at 592-93.
56. /d. at 597. Voting yes were Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia,
North Carolina and Georgia. New Jersey and Delaware, the only no's, were still holding
out for equal voting per state, which was not finally settled until the Senate was settled at
2 votes per state on July 23. 2 FARRAND's RECORDS at 95. In the North, Pennsylvania
(Morris' and Wilson's state) changed from no to yes from July 11 to July 12, once slaves
were taxed. Massachusetts changed from no to divided. New Hampshire, Rhode Island
and New York in the north were absent.
In the South, Maryland moved from no to yes. Charles Carrol of Maryland had apparently voted no on July 11, just so as to allow better phrasing that would not give urn-
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Rufus King of Massachusetts later complained that the
North had reluctantly acquiesced in the inequity of counting
slaves for representation in the House only under the erroneous
assumption that the federal government would rely on direct
taxes. Had it been foreseen that federal revenue would come to
the extent it did from unapportionable indirect taxes, King complained, then the states without slaves would never have allowed
slaves to be included in the determination of votes in the
House. 57 King overstated the case: taxation by slaves was at best
a modest bargaining chip. In the Committee of the Whole on
June 11, the North had voted to count slaves at three-fifths for
purposes of legislative apportionment without allocation of any
tax to slaves. The North did not need very much to convince itself again to acquiesce in counting slaves for purposes of legislative apportionment. All that was needed was enough tax on
slaves to get over a short-term Northern objection. The North
probably knew it was not getting much value from the bargain,
because it was widely argued, most vigorously by Governeur
Morris himself, that direct taxes with apportionment would be
too cumbersome to collect and would be studiously avoided. 58
Moreover, the bargain also relied on apportionment of "direct
tax," and, "direct tax" was a mutating term at the time, contracting so that it applied only to taxes that could be apportioned.
Since only "direct taxes" had to be apportioned to slaves, nonslave states could not expect to shift much of the tax burden to
the South. King was wrong to complain that that there never had
brage to the North. 1 FARRAND'S RECORDS 588 note. Luther Martin of Maryland
seemed to have moved to yes for anti-slavery reasons because the tax would discourage
slavery, whereas including slaves in voting would have just encouraged that "infamous
slave trade." Luther Martin, "Genuine Information" presented to the Maryland Legislature, (Nov. 29, 1787) in 3 FARRAND'S RECORDS 197. South Carolina moved from no to
divided, apparently because one delegate held out for counting slaves in full in representation and one acceded to counting slaves only at three-fifths.
South Carolina moved from no to divided, apparently because one delegate held out
for counting slaves in full for voting and one acceded to counting slaves only at threefifths.
57. Letter of Rufus King to Colonel Pickering (?), Nov. 4, 1803, in 3 FARRAND'S
RECORRDS 399; Rufus King, Speech to the U.S. Senate, March 1819 (?)in 3 FARRAND'S
RECORDS 429-430.
58. See, e.g., James Madison, Speech to the Federal Convention (July 11, 1787) in 2
FARRAND'S RECORDS 585 (Madison's notes) (suggesting that all delegates understood
that future revenues would be principally from imports and exports); Governeur Morris,
Speech to the Federal Convention (Aug. 16, 1787) in id. at 307 (saying that that the people of America would not have the money to pay direct taxes: "Seize and sell their effects
and you push them into revolt"); Alexander Hamilton, Speech to the New York Ratification Convention, (June 27, 1788) in 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES 351 (saying that imposts may
increase to such a degree as to render direct taxes unnecessary).
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been apportioned taxes reaching slaves. The apparent bargain
was not that Congress was supposed to impose apportioned
taxes, but only that if it did impose an apportioned tax, it needed
to count slaves at three-fifths.
In 1820 Charles Pinckney of South Carolina dismissed
Northern complaints that direct taxes had not raised as much as
expected, since fully productive slaves should have been counted
at 100% for purposes of representation anyway. Pinckney was
appealing to principles that would have been accepted in 1787:
that votes should follow wealth and that slaves contributed to
wealth. 59 The only controversial aspect of Pinckney's 1820 comment was his claim to count slaves at 100%. The accepted compromise was to fix slaves' contribution to wealth at three-fifths.
Pinckney seems right, however, that the tax disincentive did not
have to be meaningful because the consensus of the Convention
was that votes followed wealth.
Charles Bullock argued in 1900 that apportionment of direct taxes "originated in the struggle to effect a compromise
on the question of representation for the slaves. " 60 "It had no
basis in any rational scheme for regulating taxation, and could
have had none. " 61 That description captures the original meaning of apportionment of tax.
B. NO VETO INTENDED

The historical context shows that apportionment was never
intended as a restraint or veto on direct tax.
1. The Ordinariness of Apportionment

Removing the Southern incentive to import slaves was the
proximate cause of the decision to require the apportionment of
direct taxes, but the adoption of that requirement occurred in a
context in which apportionment of tax was an ordinary rule. Under the Articles of Confederation, Congress had no tax power
and had to raise all its revenue by assigning each state a quota to

See infra note 190.
Charles 1. Bullock, The Origin, Purpose and Effect of the Direct-Tax Clause of
the Federal Constitution. 1/., 15 POL. SCI. Q. 452,452 (1900).
61. !d.; see also EDWIN R.A. SELIGMAN, THE INCOME TAX: A STUDY OF THE
59.
60.

HISTORY, THEORY AND PRACTICE OF INCOME TAXATION AT HOME AND ABROAD 555
(2ded. 1914) ("[I]t is dear that it was due simply and solely to the attempt to solve the
difficulty connected wnh the maintenance of slavery.").
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be raised by the state under its own tax system. 62 The requisition
system was about to disappear, but the Founders assumed that
the status quo of requisitions would continue. 63 In a meaningful
sense, apportionment by state was just a continuation of earlier
requisitions upon states, except that the tax would be collected
by federal officials and the objects of tax would be set at the federal level.
Apportionment by some formula or other was originally inevitable because there was no other way to collect men or arms
for the war for independence. Allocation of requisition among
states arose when Congress was just a revolutionary, even illegal,
assembly of delegates without any employees. Population, including slaves at three-fifths, was a formula for allocating requisitions or tax revenues when Congress proposed it in 1783. 64
When the 1783 formula entered the Constitutional debates as a
method for allocating votes in Congress, using population and
the three-fifths ratio for taxes as well would have been a natural
reflex because it was a familiar system for requisitions. In the
1895 case of Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 65 the Supreme Court called apportionment "one of the bulwarks of private rights and private property." 66 That would have sounded
strange to the Founders because apportionment was not a bulwark of anything, but just an ordinary way to collect taxes.
2. Direct Tax Considered "Unrestricted" by Both Sides

The most hard-fought issue of the ratification debate was
over whether the federal government would have the power to
lay direct or internal taxes. Neither side of those debates, how62. Articles of Confederation, art. VIII. March 1, 1781, 19 JCC 217 (1781).
63. A Freeman Ill [Tench Coxe], To the Minority of the Convention of Pennsylvania, PENNSYLVANIA GAZETIE (Philadelphia) (Feb. 6, 1788), reprinted in 16
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 49, 51 (saying that if the if states raise their quotas of a requisition by themselves in the most expeditious way, a federal government with the least
degree of reason or virtue would not interfere); James HcHenry, Debate in the Maryland
House of Representatives (Nov. 29, 1787), in 3 FARRAND'S RECORDS 149 (arguing that
Congress would not exercise its power over direct taxes if the respective states would
raise their quotas in any other manner more suitable to their own inclinations); Letter
from Roger Sherman and Oliver Ellsworth to Samuel Huntington, Governor of Connecticut (Sept. 26, 1787) in 13 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 470,471 (saying that Congress's
authority over direct tax need not be exercised if each state will furnish its quota); THE
FEDERALIST No. 45, at 312-3 (James Madison) (Jan. 26, 1788) (Congress would probably
allow states to supply their quotas by their own collections).
64. Debates in the Continental Congress (April 18, 1783) in 24 JCC 260 (April 18,
1783).
65. 157 u.s. 429 (1895).
66. 1d. at 583.
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ever, saw apportionment as a restraint on direct taxes. Notwithstanding the apportionment requirement, both sides said that the
proposed Constitution would give Congress unrestricted power
to lay direct taxes, for better or worse.
In the ratification conventions, the Anti-Federalists proposed an amendment that would have denied the federal government the power to lay a direct tax in a state that was willing
to pay its requisition quota. Seven of the thirteen states endorsed
the recommendation for restrictions on direct tax as they ratified
the Constitution. 67 Only two states rejected the recommendation.68 The Anti-Federalists generall~ conceded that Congress
might be allowed to lay the impost. 9 Imposts were taxes that
could be collected without interfering with the internal police of
the states. 70 Denying Congress the power to lay direct or internal
taxes, however, was "the point most dear to the opposition" 71
and "the chief object of (Anti-Federalist] persuit." 72 AntiFederalist opposition, Madison told Washington, was reducible
"to a single point, the power of direct taxation. " 73 The AntiFederalists argued that giving the federal government the power
to impose direct taxes changed the system of government from a
confederation of states into a consolidated, single government.
Giving the federal government the power to lay direct taxes,
Anti-Federalist George Mason argued, is "calculated to annihi-

67. The states that recommended amendment denying the Federal government the
power to lay direct taxes if the state paid its quota of a requisition are (1) Massachusetts
(February 7, 1788), 1 ELLIOT'S DEBATES 322, 323; (2) South Carolina (May 23, 1788), 1
ELLIOT'S DEBATES 325; (3) New Hampshire (June 21, 1788), 1 ELLIOT'S DEBATES 325,
326; (4) Virginia (June 27,1788),10 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 1550,1556; (5) New York
(July 26, 1788), 1 ELLIOT'S DEBATES 327, 329; (6) North Carolina (August 1, 1788), 4
ELLIOT'S DEBATES 245; and (7) Rhode Island (May 29, 1790), 1 ELLIOT'S DEBATES 336.
68. The rejecting states were Pennsylvania (2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 624) and
Maryland. 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES 553.
69. See, e.g., An Old Whig, Letter VI, PHILADELPHIA lNDEP. GAZETTEER (Nov. 24,
1787), reprinted in 14 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 218 (arguing that the true line between
the powers of Congress and the several states is between internal and external taxes);
Letter from Brutus V to the People of the State of New York, N.Y.J. (Dec. 13, 1787), reprinted in 14 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 427 (conceding that the new federal government
might be given the authority to lay the impost because smuggling and concern for the
merchants would keep tax rates low).
70. Oliver Ellsworth, Debate in the Connecticut Ratification Convention (Jan. 7,
1788), in 3 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 549-50.
71. Letter of Tench Coxe to James Madison (July 23, 1788), in 11 MADISON
PAPERS 194.
72. Letter of Hardin Burnley to James Madison (Dec. 5, 1789), in 12 MADISON
PAPERS 460.
73. Letter of James Madison to George Washington (Dec. 5, 1789), in 12 MADISON
PAPERS at 459.
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late totally the State Governments." 74 To render the Congress
"safe and proper," Anti-Federalist James Monroe progosed to
"take from it one power only": "that of direct taxation." 5
The Anti-Federalists did not understand that the apportionment was a killer requirement because they stated that direct
taxation was (unfortunately) available to Congress without restriction under the Constitution unless their amendment was
76
passed. The hard-fought debate over direct taxation involved
taxes that the document subjected to apportionment. The AntiFederalists neither saw apportionment as restricting nor embraced it as responsive to their objections.
The proponents of the Constitution also described the
power of direct taxation as unrestricted, but they argued that
Congress would need the power, especially during war. Article I,
section 8 of the Constitution gives Congress what seems to be a
plenary power to tax "to provide for the common Defence and
general Welfare. " 77 During the New York ratification convention Hamilton advocated an unlimited federal power to levy direct taxes:
A constitution cannot set bounds to a nation's wants; it ought
not, therefore, to set bounds to its resources. Unexpected invasions, long and ruinous wars, may demand all the possible
abilities of the country. Shall not your government have
power to call these abilities into action? The contingencies of
society are not reducible to calculations. They cannot be fixed
78
or bounded, even in imagination.

Oliver Ellsworth told Connecticut that war was increasingly a
matter settled by the purse and not the sword: a government that
could command only a fraction of the nation's resources for was

74. George Mason, Speech to the Virginia Ratification Convention (June 4, 1788)
in 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES 29.
75. James Monroe, Debates in the Virginia Ratification Convention (June 10, 1788)
in 9 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 1109. See also" Address of Seceding Assemblymen to the
Pennsylvania General Assembly" (Philadelphia, Oct. 2, 1787) in 13 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY 296-297 (saying that had the convention left the exercise of internal taxation to
the separate states, there would be no objection to the plan of government).
76. Patrick Henry, Speech to the Virginia Ratification Convention, (June 5, 1788)
in 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES 51( saying "The clause before you gives a power of direct taxation, unbounded and unlimited"); John Lansing, Speech to the New York Ratification
Convention (June 28, 1788) in ELLIOT's DEBATES 371 (opposing Article I,§ 8, clause 1
because it "confers a right of ... laying direct taxes without restriction").
77. U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 8, cl. 1.
78. Alexander Hamilton, Speech to the New York Ratification Convention (June
27, 1788) in 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES 351.
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"like a man with but one arm to defend [him]self." 79 In time of
war, an enemy with a powerful navy eliminates revenue from the
imposts with an effective blockade. "Strike out direct taxation
from the list of federal authorities," said Madison, and Virginia
will be open to "surprize and devastation whenever an enemy
powerful at Sea chuses to invade her." 80 More generally, the first
purpose of the Constitution was to solve a federal fiscal crisis
and to allow the federal government to pay Revolutionary War
debts. When war came again, as the Founders expected, the federal government would have to borrow again. 81
George Washington told Thomas Jefferson that he would
embrace any tolerable compromise in the fight over ratification
and would not object much to any of the amendments the AntiFederalists suggested except their proposal to prevent direct
taxation. 82 Washington thought the direct tax restriction was the
amendment that the Anti-Federalists were demanding most
strenuously. 83 Washington's stubborn defense of direct taxation
represented the Founders' intent.

79. Oliver Ellsworth, Speech to the Connecticut Convention (Jan. 7, 1788), in 2
ELLIOT'S DEBATES 191. See also THE FEDERALIST No. 36, at 175 (Alexander Hamilton)
(January 8, 1788) (acknowledging aversion "to every project that is calculated to disarm
the government of a single weapon which ... might be usefully employed for general defence and security."); THE FEDERALIST No. 31, at 149-150 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jan. 1,
1788) (arguing that since federal government had unlimited responsibilities in time of
war or domestic unrest, it must be granted unlimited power to fund satisfaction of its responsibilities even in ordinary times).
80. Letter from James Madison to George Thomas (Jan. 29, 1789), in 2 THE FIRST
FEDERAL ELECfiON, 1788-1790, at 344 (Gordon DenBover, ed. 1984). Accord, Elisha
Porter, in DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS IN THE CONVENTION OF THE COMMONWEALTH
OF MASSACHUSETTS, HELD IN THE YEAR 1788 319 (Brandford K. Pierce & Charles
Hale, eds. 1856) (saying that "to grant only an impost is to invite our enemies to attack
us, for shuting our ports is to destroy us."); Letter from Thomas Jefferson to George
Washington (Nov. 4, 1787), in 14 JEFFERSON PAPERS 328 (saying that "[c]alculation has
convinced me that circumstances may arise and probably will arise, wherein all the resources of taxation will be necessary for the safety of the state").
81. THE FEDERALIST No. 30, at 146-47 (Alexander Hamilton) (saying that public
credit is essential to public safety); Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison
(May 2, 1788), in 13 JEFFERSON PAPERS 129-130 (saying that good credit is indispensable
to the present system of carrying on war, and that "[t] he existence of a nation having not
credit is always precarious"); Letter of Roger Sherman to William Floyd (date unknown), in 3 DoCUMENTARY HISTORY 353 ("Our credit as a nation is sinking" and "the
resources of the country could not be drawn out to defend against a foreign invasion");
Republican VI, CONN. COURANT (MARCH 19, 1787), reprinted in DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION: MICROFICHE SUPPL. CONN.
(saying that it would be strange if Britain or Spain did not force us into war in the next
10-15 years).
82. Letter from George Washington to Thomas Jefferson (August 31, 1788) in 30
WASHINGTON WRITINGS 82-83.
83. /d.
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In the end, the Federalists defeated the Anti-Federalist
amendment restraining federal direct tax in the first Congress
when the Bill of Rights was debated. 84 Given that a majority of
states had endorsed the restriction, the proposed restraint on the
federal direct tax came close to adoption. Since the Federalist
proponents of the Constitution won the battle to allow what
both sides called an unrestricted federal power to lay direct tax,
however, allowing apportionment to cripple direct taxation
would reverse the victory that the Federalists in fact achieved.
The strenuous debate is also good evidence that that apportionment was not viewed as a restraint or veto of any federal tax. No
important player at the time knew or understood apportionment's potential absurdity.
C. THE 1787 DICTIONARY MEANING OF "DIRECf TAX"

1. "Direct Tax" Meant "Apportioned Tax"
Dictionaries were constructed in 1787, as they are now,
through a broad sampling of word usage. 85 In a well-constructed
dictionary at the time of the Constitution, "direct tax" would
have been a synonym for apportioned tax, including state taxes
used to satisfy a requisition quota that had been apportioned to
a state. The definition of "direct tax" came from the process of
apportionment. If the term referred to specific taxes, it was only
because those taxes were typically apportioned. As particular
taxes ceased to be apportioned or apportionable, they ceased to
be direct.
The original meaning of direct tax referred to all state taxes
except the impost. In 1783, Congress proposed that it be given
the power to enact a 5% "impost," or tax on imports. It proposed a separate $1.5 million requisition apportioned to each
state by population. The term "direct tax" referred to the requisition part of the proposal, but not to the impost. 86 Before the
84. 1 ANNALS 431-42, 660-65, 773-77 (reporting the 39-9 defeat of a proposal to
prohibit direct taxation if states paid their requisition quota requisition).
85. Compare Samuel Johnson, Preface to the DICfiONARY (1755) (saying that the
sense of a word "may easily be collected entire from the examples"), quoted in Harold
Whitehall, The Eng/ish Language, in WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICfiONARY OF THE
AMERICAN LANGUAGE xxxiv (College ed. 1957) with The English Language, in
MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICfiONARY 28a-29a (10th ed. 1993) (describing
the current lexicographical practice of using a collection of citations to ascertain meaning
and changes in meaning).
86. See, e.g., Letter of Eliphalet Dyer to Jonathan Trumbull, Sr. (March 18, 1783) in
20 LETTERS OF DELEGATES 44-45 (asking how war debts can be satisfied "by direct taxes
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Constitution, a state could use any tax to satisfy its requisitions.
Any state tax, except for the proposed impost, could thus be a
"direct tax." In the ratification debates, "direct tax" referred to
87
state taxes that would be used to satisfy a state's quota. In 1796
Oliver Wolcott, Hamilton's successor as Secretary of the Treasury, prepared an inventory of "direct taxes" for the purpose of
helping Congress enact an apportioned tax. Wolcott's inventor1
consisted simply of a list of the taxes used by the various states. 8
The original distinction between "direct tax" and "impost"
became the crucial distinction in the most important fight in the
ratification process: whether the federal government would be
able to lay direct or internal taxes in a state that was willing to
pay its requisition quota. Within those debates, "direct tax" was
a synonym for internal taxes, and "indirect tax" was a synonym
for the "impost" or tax on imports. 89 "Dry taxes" were "direct
taxes." 90 The leading Anti-Federalist spokesmen, including
Brutus,91 Federal Farmer,92 and Minority of the Pennsylvania
on each state, justly proportioned, when the People have been so harrassed with taxes &
Collectors, [whereas] dutys or Impost on foreign trade or Importation [are] paid by the
Mercht in the first Instance and then it must take its Chance"); Letter of Samuel Wharton to John Cook (Jan. 6, 1783) in 19 LEITERS OF DELEGATES 552 (saying that with the
failure of the 1781 federal impost proposal, the states will need to restore federal credit
by "the irksome Task of laying immediate, and direct Taxes upon their Citizens."); Alexander Hamilton, Speech to New York Assembly (Feb 18, 1787) reported in 1 THE
COLUMBIAN MAGAZINE 514 (June 1787) ("If we do not employ the impost, we must find
others in direct taxation").
87. John Marshall, Debates in the Virginia Ratification Convention (June 10, 1788),
9 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 1122. See also Oliver Wolcott, Jr., Direct Taxes, H.R. DOC.
NO. 100-4 (1796), in 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: CLASS III FINANCE 431, (Walter Lowrie & Matthew St. Clair Clarke eds., Gales & Seaton 1832) (describing Virginia taxes as
collected, first by requiring county commissioners to ascertain the value of property
within their county and, secondly, with taxes at fixed rates on various items including:
salaries, interest, annuities, slaves, horses, carriages, mules).
88. /d. at 414
89. See, e.g., George Nicolas, Debate in the Virginia Ratification Convention (June
6, 1788), in 3 ELLIOT's DEBATES 98 (touting the Constitution's allowing federal imposts,
which would reduce direct taxes); Connecticutensis, To the People of Connecticut (1787),
reprinted in 3 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 512-13 (describing "indirect taxation" as "duties
laid upon those foreign articles which are imported and sold among us").
90. Amos Singletary, Speech to the Massachusetts Ratification Convention (Jan.
25, 1788) in 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES 101 ("They tell us Congress won't lay dry taxes upon
us, but collect all the money they want by impost").
91. Letter from Brutus V to the People of the State of New York (Nov. 27, 1787),
N.Y. J., (Dec. 13, 1787), reprimed in 14 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 427 (conceding that
the new federal government might be given the authority to lay the impost because
smuggling and concern for the merchants would keep tax rates low, but contesting federal power over direct taxes, such as "excises, duties on written instruments, on every
thmg we eat, dnnk, or wear") (emphasis added).
92. Federal Farmer, Letter Ill (Oct. 10, 1787) in 14 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 35-36
(asking whether it was wise to vest internal taxes, such as poll, land, excises and duties in
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93

Convention, used "direct tax" as a term that included all internal taxes, but not the impost. The leading Federalist spokesmen,
including James Madison, 94 James Wilson, 95 and Alexander
Hamilton, 96 did too. Jefferson, who wavered on the Constitution,
also used "direct" and "internal" tax as synonyms. 97
The definition of "direct tax" had to contract with the adoption of the Constitution, however, because some taxes ceased to
be apportionable. An excise tax, for example, would have been a
direct tax under the requisition system because it was not an impost. An excise was an internal or dry land tax and it could have
been a source of revenue for the federal government only as
used by the states to satisfy apportioned requisitions. "Excises"
were commonly treated as "direct taxes" in the debates. 98 The
Constitution, however, requires that "excises" be uniform across
the states. 99 It also requires that "direct taxes" be apportioned

the federal government, and saying that external tax, that is, the impost duty on imported
goods, was different).
93. "The Address and Reasons of Dissent of the Minority of the Convention of the
State of Pennsylvania to their Constituents" (Dec. 18, 1787) in 15 DoCUMENTARY
HISTORY 30-31 (saying that the power of direct taxation will further apply to every individual as congress may tax land, cattle, trades, occupations, & to any amount, and every
object of internal taxation); An Old Whig, Letter VI, PHILADELPHIA INDEP. GAZETTEER
(Nov. 24, 1787) in 14 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 218 (arguing that the true line between
the powers of Congress and the several states is between internal and external taxes).
94. James Madison, Debates in the Virginia Ratification Convention (June 11,
1788), in 9 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 1146 (saying that the Southern States will bear
more of the impost because they import more, but the inequality will be lessened if Congress could also impose "direct taxes").
95. James Wilson, Speech in the State House Yard, Philadelphia (Oct. 6, 1787), in
13 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 342-43 (stating that although imposts would probably be
sufficient, Congress needs the power of direct taxes within reach in cases of emergency,
and that there is no greater reason to fear a direct tax than an impost).
96. Alexander Hamilton, Speech to the New York Ratification Convention (June
27, 1788), in 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES 351 ("Possibly, in the advancement of commerce, the
imposts may increase to such a degree as to render direct taxes unnecessary.").
97. See e.g., Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Dec. 21, 1787), in 8
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 253 n.1 ("Would it not have been better to assign to Congress
exclusively the article of imposts for federal purposes, [and] to have left direct taxation
exclusively to the states?"); Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William Carmichael (Dec.
25, 1788), in 14 JEFFERSON PAPERS 385 ("Many of the opposition wish to take from
Congress the power of internal taxation.") (emphasis added).
98. See supra note 91. See also Cato Utensis, VA. INDEPENDENT CHRON. (Oct. 17,
17878), reprinted in 8 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 75 (saying that nobody but the Virginia
legislature should have the power of direct taxation, "if it should ever be found necessary
to curse this land with hateful excisemen") (emphasis added); The Impartial Examiner I,
VIRGINIA INDEPENDENT CHRONICLE (March 25, 1788) in 8 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY
462 ("Consider the [injuries] to which this country may be subjected by excise law, --by
direct taxation of every kind.").
99. U.S. CONST. art I,§ 8, cl. 1 (providing that "all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall
be uniform throughout the United States").
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among the states. 100 It is impossible to apportion a tax among
states according to population while keeping the rate the same.
It follows that a tax for which the rate must be uniform cannot
be a direct tax. Accordingly, the use of "direct tax" changed during the ratification period to exclude "excise taxes." The debates
include a good number of references in which "excise tax" is excluded from the definition of "direct tax." 101 The New York ratification convention, for example, recommended a constitutional
amendment to prohibit federal direct taxes. In a separate paragraph, that convention also recommended a prohibition on excise taxes. 102 New York's separate listing of excises tells us the
drafters did not think of excises as unambiguously covered by
"direct taxes." Resolutions in Massachusetts, South Carolina,
and Rhode Island would have prohibited Congress from laying
direct taxes unless revenues from imposts and excises were insufficient.103 Those resolutions also treated excises as not "direct
tax." There seem to be more references to direct taxes including
excises than to direct taxes excluding excises, but those references occurred before the debaters realized that excises could
not be apportioned.
Similarly the stamp tax on legal documents was a "direct
tax" before the Constitution, but ceased to be a "direct tax" once
it was clear that it could not be apportioned. One of the crises
100. U.S. CONST. art I,§ 2, cl. 3 (providing that "[r]epresentatives and direct Taxes
shall be apportioned among the several States which may be included within this Union,
according to their respective Numbers, which shall be determined by added to the whole
Number of free Persons, ... three-fifths of all other Persons"); U.S. CONST. § 9, cl. 4
(providing that "[n]o Capitation, or other direct, Tax shall be laid, unless in Proportion to
the Census or Enumeration herein before directed to be taken").
101. Benjamin Gale, Speech Before Killingworth Town Meeting in Connecticut
(Nov. 12, 1787), in 3 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 424 (arguing that they will not only tax
"by duties, impost, and excise but to levy direct taxes upon you"); Robert Dawes, Speech
to the Massachusetts Ratification Convention (Jan. 18, 1788) in 2 ELLIOT's DEBATES 42
(arguing that it is easier for Congress to resort to impost or excises than to tax wholly by
direct taxes); Francis Dana, Speech to the Massachusetts Ratification Convention (Jan.
18, 1788) in 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES 42 (arguing that Congress would not levy direct taxes
unless imposts and excises were insufficient); Robert Livingston, Speech to the New
York Ratification Convention (June 27, 1788) in 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES 344 (arguing that
Congress may need direct taxes because imposts and excises would not be enough);
Samuel Spencer, Debate in the North Carolina Ratification Convention (July 26,1788) in
4 ELLIOT'S DEBATES 76 (arguing that Congress might be allowed to lay imposts and excises, but not direct taxes).
102. The Debates in the Convention of the State of New York, 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES
329.
103. 1 ELLIOT'S DEBATES 322-23 (Massachusetts recommendation that "Congress
do not lay direct taxes but when the moneys arising from the impost and excise are insufficient"); id. at 325 (recommendation adopted in South Carolina); id at 335 (recommen·
dation adopted in Rhode Island).

318

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY

[Vol. 21:295

leading to the Revolutionary War was the British imposition of a
stamp tax. Madison described the British stamp tax as "an internal and direct tax, [which] produced a radical examination of the
subject. " 104 Under Article I, section 8 of the Constitution, however, a stamp tax has to be uniform among the states, 105 and that
prevents apportionment. The stamp tax hence ceased to be a
"direct tax" when the Constitution came into effect. Once it was
realized that a tax could not be apportioned, then that tax could
not be "direct" because apportionment was the defining characteristic of "direct tax." Any tax that was not apportioned could
not be a direct tax.
In the congressional debate in 1794 over a proposed federal
tax on carriages, Theodore Sedgewick of Massachusetts said that
any tax that could not be apportioned was not direct. Sedgewick
argued that Congress was authorized to tax every subject and
that pleasure carriages were luxuries which could properly be
taxed. Since a tax on carriages could not be allocated "by the
constitutional ratio" -i.e., counting slaves at three-fifths- the
tax was not "direct" within the sense of that word used in the
Constitution. 106 Apportionment was the defining characteristic
of a direct tax.
Some English words, including "direct tax," express conclusions. For example, I might ask my wife, "Is this trash?" She
might reply, "No, Dear, seal it up and take to the attic," or "Yes,
Dear, please take it out to the curb." I do not have to know the
contents to know whether the box is "trash," as long as I know
what to do with it. "Trash" is defined by what we are going to do
with it. Once the conclusion or process is attached to a word, it
typically acquires some characteristics. Things that are going to
be thrown away have some traits that distinguish them from
things that will be saved.
Conclusion or process words are common in English. If you
are a "target," "prey," "victim," or "bait," then someone is after
you, whatever your other traits. "Distractions," "detours," and
104. Letter from James Madison to Jos. C. Cabell (Sept. 18, 1828), in 4 ELLIOT's
DEBATES 600; see Bernard Bailyn, General Introduction to 1 PAMPHLETS OF THE
AMERICAN REVOLUTION, 1750-1765, at 124-127 (Bernard Bailyn ed., 1965) (describing
arguments by Benjamin Franklin and others that Parliament might be allowed to lay external taxes or customs duties even without representation, but could not impose internal
taxes such as stamp taxes on the colonies).
105. U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 8, cl. 1. The "duties" in clause 1 was apparently a reference
to the stamp tax. See supra note 16.
106. Theodore Sedgewick (Mass.), Debate in the U.S. House of Representatives
(May 6, 1794), in 4 ELLIOT'S DEBATES 433.
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"feints" are not the main route, although I might be able to tell
whether an attack is a feint or the main thrust only after I see how
successful it has been. The accounting terms "asset," "deferred
expense," and "basis" say that cost will be taken into account in
future earnings, but not this year. The defining aspect of the word
is the conclusion, and any other characteristics are derived from
that conclusion. "Direct tax" was like that in 1787. An item ceases
to be "trash" when the decision is made to keep it. Similarly, a tax
ceases to be a "direct tax" when it ceases to be apportioned.
2. A voidable Taxes?

Professor Erik Jensen has argued that all indirect taxes are
like sales taxes, imposed on the seller of a good, but usually included in the price of the good and passed on to buyers. Buyers
can avoid indirect taxes, he argues, by not buying the good. According to Professor Jensen, the buyer's ability to avoid a tax
provides protection against oppressive tax rates. If a tax can not
be avoided by buyer choice, then he would treat the tax as a direct tax which would have to be apportioned. 107 I argue later that
apportionment does not serve the function seeks. For now, I argue that the pass-on and buyer-choice traits do not define indirect taxes. The buyer-choice argument was used primarily to justify the impost during the constitutional debates. The argument
does not describe all indirect taxes.
It was commonly argued in the constitutional period that
the impost was a better tax than direct or internal taxes because
the impost could be collected by importing merchants and would
be passed on to willing buyers. An importing merchant would
have cash with which to pay an impost when he sold the imported goods. Taxes on land, by contrast, required payment by
an owner who might have no cash. The importer-merchant,
moreover, would ordinarily be able to add the impost to the sale
price of his goods. 108 "The price of the commodity is blended ·
107. Erik M. Jensen, The Apportionment of "Direct Taxes": Are Consumption Taxes
Constitutional?, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2334,2395,2405-07 (1997).
108. See, e.g., Letter of Eliphalet Dyer (Conn. Delegate to Congress) to Jonathan
Trumbull, Sr. (Apr. 3, 1783), in 20 LEITERS OF DELEGATES 139 (rguing that an impost is
better than dry or direct taxes because the impost is paid by the importing merchants
who have cash and who will pass on the tax only to willing buyers; also arguing that the
impost avoided "the disagreeable force of a (tax] Collector"); Letter of Eliphalet Dyer to
Jonathan Trumbull, Sr. (Mar. 18, 1783), in 20 LEITERS OF DELEGATES 45 (arguing that
an apportioned direct tax will harass the people, whereas the impost is paid "by the Merchant in the first Instance, & then it must take its Chance"); Governeur Morris, Speech
to the Federal Convention (Aug. 16, 1787) in 2 FARRAND'S RECORDS 307 (arguing that
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with the tax," Wilson told Penns.fivania, "and the person is often
not sensible of the payment." 10 A federal impost would allow
the reduction of direct taxes. 110
The Federalists used the pass-on argument to try to convince
states with good deep-water harbors to support federal impost
proposals. Rhode Island, for example, vetoed Congress's 1781
proposal for a 5% federal impost to help pay war debts. Congress
tried to get Rhode Island to change its mind by telling the merchants of Rhode Island that the impost could be incorporated into
the price of the commodity so that it would be ultimately borne by
the consumer. 111 Similarly, New York vetoed Congress's 1783
proposal for a federal impost. In Federalist No. 35, Hamilton tried
to convince the merchant importers of New York to let the federal government impose a federal impost on goods through New
York harbor. Hamilton argued that the conditions of trade would
usually allow the merchants to add the impost to the price of the
goods and pass it on to the ultimate purchasers. 112
When the impost was included in the price of the imported
good, it was argued, the impost was paid by choice. An impost
blended in the price is the easiest and most just mode of taxation,
James Wilson told the Pennsylvania convention, because it is voluntary: "No man is obliged to consume more than he pleases, and
each buys in proportion only to his consumption." 113 With the tax
included in the price of the good, Hamilton argued, "the amount
to be contributed by each citizen will in a degree be at his own option, and can be regulated by an attention to his resources." 114
If the impost did suppress consumption of imported goods,
the framers of the Constitution would have liked that result. In
those mercantilist times, imports were said to lead inevitably to
the people of America will not have cash to pay direct taxes).
109. James Wilson, Speech to the Pennsylvania Ratification Convention (Dec. 4,
1787) in 4 ELLIOT'S DEBATES 467.
110. George Nicolas, Speech to the Virginia Ratification Convention (June 6, 1788)
in 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES 98; Letter of Samuel Wharton to John Cook (Jan. 6, 1783) in 19
LETTERS OF DELEGATES 552 (saying that with the failure of the 1781 federal impost proposal, the states will need to restore federal credit by "the irksome Task of laying immediate, and direct Taxes upon their Citizens."); Alexander Hamilton, Speech to New York
Assembly (Feb. 18, 1787) reported in 1 THE COLUMBIAN MAGAZINE 514 (June 1787)
("If we do not employ the impost, we must find others in direct taxation").
111. Committee of Congress consisting of Alexander Hamilton, James Madison and
Thomas Fitzsimmons, "Reply to the Rhode Island Objections Touching Import Duties"
(1782) in 1 ELLIOT'S DEBATES 100.
112. THE FEDERALIST No. 35, at 164-65 (Alexander Hamilton).
113. James Wilson, Speech to the Pennsylvania Ratification Convention (Dec. 4,
1787) in 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES 467.
114. THE FEDERALIST NO. 21, at 102 (Alexander Hamilton).
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"luxurl, effeminacy, and corruption" 115 and to wanton consump117
tion." Imports drained the country of precious specie. Madison hoped that a high impost would disrupt the traditional de118
An
pendence of Virginia upon trade with the British.
anonymous New Yorker argued that New York should prohibit
importation of all "foreign articles that might be made [domesti119
cally] and levying heavy duties on all imported luxuries."
Buyer choice moderated the rates of the impost because
buyers would reduce government revenue if the government
tried to raise rates too high. Hamilton argued in Federalist 21
that indirect taxes on consumption by their nature carry safeguards against excess rates:
[Taxes on articles of consumption] prescribe their own limit;
which cannot be exceeded without defeating the end proposed, that is, an extension of the revenue .... If duties are
too high, they lessen the consumption; the collection is
eluded; and the product to the treasury is not so great as when
they are confined within proper and moderate bounds. This
forms a complete barrier against any material oppression of
the citizens by taxes of this class, and is itself a natural limita120
tion of the power of imposing them.

Anti-Federalist Brutus made the same argument. Brutus
conceded that the federal government might be granted the impost, because if federal taxes are "laid higher than trade will
bear, the merchants will cease importing, or smuggle their
goods." 121 "We have therefore sufficient security," Brutus concluded, "arising from the nature of the thing, against burdensome, and intolerable impositions from this kind of tax." 122
Brutus would not, however, concede to the federal government
115. See, e.g., Letter from George Washington to James Warren (Oct. 7, 1785), in 3
PAPERS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON: CONFEDERATION SERIES, at 299-300 (W. Abbott
ed., 1994) (arguing for the necessity of a centralized controlling power over commerce to
balance against the luxury, effeminacy and corruption introduced by foreign trade).
116. TENCH COXE, AN ENQUIRY INTO PRINCIPLES ON WHICH A COMMERCIAL
SYSTEM SHOULD BE FOUNDED (1787).
117. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Mar. 18, 1786), in 8 MADISON
PAPERS 500-01.
118. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Dec. 9, 1787), in 24 LETTERS
OF DELEGATES 576.
119. "A Citizen of Dutchess County", NEW YORK PACKET (Mar. 27, 1785), referenced in JOHN P. KAMINSKI, GEORGE CLINTON: YEOMAN POLITICIAN OF THE NEW
REPUBLIC 99 (1993).
120. THE FEDERALIST No. 21, at 102 (Alexander Hamilton).
121. Letter from Brwus V to the People of the State of New York (Nov. 27, 1787),
N.Y. J., (Dec. 13, 1787), reprinted in 14 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 427
122. !d.
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any internal or dry land taxes. He opposed giving the federal
government any power to lay excises, duties on written instruments, poll taxes, or land taxes. 123 Brutus did not think the
buyer-choice argument justified any federal dry or internal taxes.
Anti-Federalist hatred of direct tax, moreover, included hatred
of excise taxes. Centinel in Philadelphia, for example, argued
that to extend federal tax power to "the excise and every specie
of internal tax would perpetually interfere with state laws. " 124
Cato Utensis, in Virginia feared two rival excisetax men at your
door. 125 Son of History in New York opposed federal excise
taxes by which your "bedchamber will be subject to be searched
by the brutal tools of power, under pretense that they contain
contraband or smuggled merchandise. " 126 Alexander Hamilton
seems wise in stating that the "genius of the people will ill brook
the inquisitive and preemptory spirit of excise laws." 127
The argument that indirect taxes are like sales taxes, passed
on to a willing buyer, does not work for all indirect taxes. A stamp
tax on legal documents, for example, is an indirect tax because it
must have a uniform tax rate and hence cannot be apportioned.
The testator of a will or the plaintiff in a lawsuit, however, is not a
seller of goods with a voluntary buyer, and there can be no expectation that the stamp tax will be shifted away from the party who
pays it. Similarly an excise tax can not be direct because it must
have a uniform rate. As a tax on whiskey and the like, an excise is
a tax to suppress immorality and luxury. 128 What makes it an ex123. /d.
124. Centinel II, PHILA. FREEMAN'S J. (Oct. 12, 1787), reprinted in 13
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 465.
125. Cato Utensis, VA. INDEPENDENT CHRON. (Oct. 17, 1788), reprinted in 8
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 75.
126. Son of History, NEW YORK J., Nov. 8, 1787, reprinted in 13 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY 481 (opposing excise taxes by which your "bedchamber will be subject to be
searched by the brutal tools of power, under pretense that they contain contraband or
smuggled merchandise).
127. THE FEDERALIST No. 12 at 57 (Alexander Hamilton) (Nov. 27, 1787).
128. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Sarsfield (Apr. 3, 1789), in 15 JEFFERSON
PAPERS 25 (defining "excise" as solely a whiskey tax in New England), quoted in
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 379 (1933); Letter from Alexander Hamilton to George
Washington (Aug. 18, 1792), 12 HAMILTON PAPERS 235 (extolling a federal excise tax
because there no article of more general and equal consumption than distilled spirits
(whiskey)). The Puritan taxes called "excises," however, also taxed other things "for the
Suppression of Immorality, Luxury and Extravagance." See 4 THE LAW PRACTICE OF
ALEXANDER HAMILTON, at 302 (Julius Goebel, Jr. & Joseph H. Smith eds. 1980) (describing the Massachusetts, New Hampshire and Rhode Island "excises"). See also AN
ACT FOR LAYING AN EXCISE ON SUNDRY ARTICLES OF CONSUMPTION WITHIN THIS
STATE (1783) reprinted in THE FIRST LAWS OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT 58 (John
D. Cushing ed., photo. reprint 1982) (1785) (imposing "excise" on hard liquor plus a
number of other luxuries, including beaver or felt hats, coffee, and chocolate).
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cise tax is not the manner of collection, 129 but rather the puritanical purpose of suppressing consumption and luxury. Even the impost was collected not upon a sale, but rather when the shipper
landed his goods on the dock under the eye of the customs house.
There was at the time no tax like a sales tax, collected from the
seller upon the completion of the sale.
In Federalist 21, Hamilton applied the pass-on and buyerchoice arguments to what he termed "taxes on consumption,"
but his audience would have understood taxes on "consumption"
to refer either to taxes on imported indulgences or to puritanical
taxes on luxuries and extravagances-that is, either to imposts or
to excises. 130 "Excises and imposts," as Nathaniel Gorham told
the Massachusetts ratification convention, were taxes whereby
"the man of luxury will pay; and the middling and the poor Rarts
of the community, who live by their industry, will go clear." 1 1
The argument that a tax could be avoided by choice can be
extended by analogy from the impost onto internal or dry land
taxes. Whiskey was an item of nearly general consumption at the
time, but a taxpayer could avoid the whiskey tax by abstinence.
If that is what is meant by avoidability, however, then all taxes at
issue are indirect. One could avoid a land tax by never buying
land. One could avoid the burden on tax on slaves or cotton by
never owning slaves or raising cotton. If tax rates on income or
wealth get too high, those taxes could be avoided in full just by
renouncing all earthly possessions. Indeed, the argument that the
government will lose revenue by raising rates on wealth and income is a common one. 132 Taking the avoidability argument seriously means that the only unavoidable direct tax is a head tax.
Thus, treating the avoidability as the defining characteristic of
"indirect" means that the only tax that is direct and needs to be

129. For a proposal to impose a federal excise on all spirituous liquors to be collected at the place of distillery, see Report of a Committee of Congress (March 11, 1783 ),
19 JCC 782.
130. James Wilson, Speech to the Pennsylvania Ratification Convention (Dec. 4,
1787), in 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES 467 (describing the impost as a tax on consumption); Unsent letter from James Madison to John Tyler (1833), in 3 FARRAND'S RECORDS 530
(saying that New York refused to give up the state impost in order to "tax the consumption of her neighbours").
131. Nathaniel Gorham, Speech to the Massachusetts Ratification Convention (Jan.
25, 1788) in 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES 106 .
. 132. For a review of the literature and evidence on the argument that raising rates
w1ll reduce government revenue, see Austan Goolsbee, Evidence on the High-Income
Laffer Curve from Six Decades of Tax Reform, 2 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC
ACTIVITY 1 (1999).
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apportioned is the head tax. That is an acceptable conclusion to
. 1s
. not what p ro f essor Jensen advocates.
me, 133 but 1t
II. THE REJECTION OF APPORTIONMENT
A. THE ABSURDITY OF APPORTIONMENT

Apportionment of direct tax according to population turns
out to be absurd for reasons that the framers did not understand.
In the 1796 case of Hylton v. United States, 134 for example, the
Supreme Court examined a carriage tax, a common and perfectly legitimate tax of the times. Carriages are disproportionately an urban vehicle, however, and the Court hypothesized
that one state might have 10 times more carriages per capita
than another. 135 To meet apportionment under such circumstances, tax rates would have to be 10 times higher on carriages
in the latter state than in the former.
There is and never was any reason why people in the latter
state should pay higher rates on carriages. The carriage tax had
been a common tax in the colonies and there is nothing especially suspect about it. The absurdity is forced by the rule of apportionment. Apportionment can be even worse-the first fool
to drive a carriage into Kentucky would be called upon pay the
state's entire quota. The result is nonsense.
Apportionment among the states by population remains absurd. Apportionment victimizes poor states where the tax base
per capita is especially thin. Connecticut has roughly twice the
per capita wealth and consumption of Mississippi. 136 An appor133. Johnson, Apportionment of Direct Taxes, supra note 1, at 80.
134. 3 u.s. 171 (1796).
135. /d. at 174.
136. In 2001, Connecticut had per capita personal income of almost $42,000 and Mississippi had per capita personal income of almost $22,000. 2002 U.S. CENSUS DEPT.
STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES, at 426. Mississippi had a population of
close to 2.9 million in 2001 (id. at 22), so it had a total potential income tax base of 2.9
million * $22,000 or $63.8 billion. Connecticut had a population of close to 3.4 million in
2001 (id.) so it had a total tax base of 3.4 million * $42,000 or $142.8 billion. If the federal
government needed to collect $72 billion in apportionable direct tax from the two states
to pay the war debts, the total would be apportioned [3.4/(2.9+3.4)]*72 billion or $39 billion tax to Connecticut, which would require average tax rates of $39/142.8 or 27%. Of
the $72 billion, [2.9/(2.9+3.4)]*$72 billion or $33 billion would be allocated to Mississippi,
and $33 billion/$63.8 billion would require that Mississippians carry a 52% average tax
rate. The results can be generalized by algebra for any tax base: if State A has only 1/k as
much tax base per capita as State B, then State A citizens will have to pay average rates
that are k times the rates in State B. Johnson, Apportionment of Direct Tax, supra note 1,
at 7 n. 24.
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tioned federal tax on consumption or wealth would mean that
Mississippians would have to pay tax at rates roughly twice as
high as Connecticut citizens. Mississippians would need to pay
tax at twice the rates under apportionment because they are
comparatively poor and have so little tax base over which to
spread their quota. This effect was never intended and has never
been defended, even by proponents of apportionment.
B. BELIEVING IMPOSSIBLE THINGS

The arguments used to defend the rule demonstrates that
the Founders did not understand the absurdity of apportionment. The Founders believed in impossible things. They believed, for instance, that taxes for which a uniform rate was required could be apportioned, even though any reasonable
assumption about the distribution of the taxed items means that
uniform rates prevent apportionment. The Founders believed
that apportionment would protect poor states, even though apportionment in fact forces poor states to pay higher rates. The
Federalists argued, perhaps disingenuously, that apportionment
would prevent taxes on slaves, even though apportionment in
fact provides no such assurances. Nor can Apportionment prevent taxes with disparate sectional impact.
1. The Inconsistency of Apportionment With Uniform Rates

Article I, section 8, clause 1 of the Constitution provides
that imposts, duties, and excises must be uniform throughout the
United States. Uniform rates prevents apportionment, but the
Founders seem to have believed that excises and duties needed
to apportioned. The only tax that can both be apportioned under
the required formula and have a uniform tax rate would be a
"head tax," "capitation tax," or "poll tax" in which each free
person in a state bears, for instance, a $1000 tax and each slave
bears a three-fifths tax or $600. Otherwise, apportionment and
uniformity of rate are inconsistent. The odds against finding any
other tax base that happens to be equal in every state per capita,
counting slaves at three-fifths, are impossibly high and even if it
were found, it would disappear by changes in the tax base by the
end of the day. The Framers abhorred the head tax, the one tax
that might satisfr both criteria, and promised that Congress
7
would not use it. 1 Apportionment of tax by population was the
137.

Nathaniel Gorham, Debate in the Massachusetts Ratification Convention (Jan.
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formula for apportioning quotas among the states. It was never
considered a legitimate formula for determining the subject of
tax within a state. Population figures in the formula, John Adams explained, were adopted "as an index of the wealth of the
state & not as subjects of taxation." 138
Apportionment could be satisfied by first assigning each
state a quota by population and then collecting the quota by a
mishmash of taxes that varied by state. 139 None of the taxes used
in the states could be excises or duties because the excises and
duties must have a uniform rate throughout the United States.
Apportionment would thus destroy the use of excises and duties,
which the Founders considered to be excellent sources of federal
revenue. There could also be no nationally consistent tax base or
tax policy under such a program. Citizens of different states
would face different tax rates. There would be many enclaves
with relatively low tax rates luring citizens facing higher rates in
their home states. An apportioned tax is too much like the requisition system, and the framers said that they did not want "to
drive the Legislature to the plan of [r]equisitions." 140 Even beyond the mismash, apportionment of federal tax among the
states by population necessarily imposes the most oppressive
rates on the poorest states because poor states have the thinnest
tax base over which to spread their quota. No adjustment of
taxed items or rates can avoid that.
The Founders did not know that uniformity and apportionment were inconsistent. They commonly categorized the "excises"
and "duties," which must be uniform, as "direct taxes," which
25, 1788) in 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATEs 106 (calling the head tax "a distressful tax" which
"would never be adopted"); Francis Dana, Debates in Massachusetts Ratifying Convention (Jan. 18, 1788) in 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES 43 (saying that "a capitation tax is abhorrent
to the feelings of human nature, and, I venture to trust, will never be adopted by Congress"); Letter from James Madison to Jos. C. Cabell (Sept. 18, 1828) in 4 ELLIOT'S
DEBATES 605 ('the odious tax on persons"); Alexander Hamilton, Report on the Subject
of Manufactures (Dec. 5, 1791) in 10 HAMILTON PAPERS 330 (stating that poll taxes are
unfriendly to manufacture and injurious to the industrious poor).
138. John Adams (Mass.), Debate in the Continental Congress (July 12, 1776) in 4
LETTERS OF DELEGATES 440 (Jefferson notes) (saying that numbers of people were
taken as an index of the wealth of the state not as subjects of taxation).
139. Edmund Randolph, Debates in the Virginia Ratification Convention (June 7,
1788) in 9 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 1006, 1022 (saying that if a tax was laid on one uniform article throughout the Union, its operation would be oppressive, but that a tax will
undoubtedly be laid in each state in the manner that will best accommodate the people).
140. George Mason, Speech to the Federal Convention (July 12, 1787) in 1
FARRAND'S RECORDS 592. Cf. Gouverneur Morris, Speech to the Federal Convention
(July 17, 1787) in 2 FARRAND'S RECORDS 26 (opposing requisitions, "which are subversive of the idea of government").
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must be apportioned. Madison, the most important drafter of the
Constitution, did not know that apportioned taxes could not be
uniform even after the completion of the ratification debates. At
the start of the new Congress in 1789, for instance, Hamilton
sought Madison's private advice on what taxes the new federal
government should impose. Madison replied that he would not
recommend a general stamp tax (i.e., a "duty" in constitutional
terms), in part because it "could not be so framed as to fall in due
proportion on the States without more information than can be
speedily obtained. " 141 A stamp tax can never be framed "to fall in
due proportion" upon the states, even with unlimited time, because it is a duty that must have a uniform rate. One should not
need more information or investigation to ascertain the impossibility. In the tax arguments in the new Congress, moreover, Madison called a tax on domestic whiskey a "direct tax," 142 even
though the whiskey tax is the paradigm of an "excise." An excise
cannot be apportioned. Madison simply did not know that uniform rates precluded apportionment, even after more than three
years of debate over the constitutional text.
The Anti-Federalists also explicitly defined "direct tax,"
which must be apportioned, to include "excises," which cannot
be apportioned. The Anti-Federalists hated allowing the federal
government to levy direct taxes. Had any of them understood
that direct tax and uniformity were inconsistent, they would have
used the impossibility of uniform rates against the direct tax. In a
brief to the Supreme Court in Hylton, arguing for the unconstitutionality of the carriage tax, Anti-Federalist John Taylor of
Caroline argued that apportionment "was the most important
stipulation of the whole compact" and that evasion of the restriction by a subterfuge of a "direct excise" would leave Congress
"free to levy any tax without restraint." 143 Notwithstanding Taylor's passion, one cannot apportion an excise any more than one
can have a square circle.

141. Letter from James Madison to Alexander Hamilton (Nov. 19, 1789), in 12
MADISON PAPERS 449-50.
142. James Madison, Debates in the House of Representatives (Dec. 27, 1790), in 14
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS 190 (William C. DiGiacomantonio, eta!., ed. 1995).
143. John Taylor, "An Argument Respecting the Constitutionality of the Carriage
Tax" at 33 (May 1795) quoted in 4 LAW AND PRACTICE OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON
supra note 124, at 327.
'
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2. Protection for the Poor?

The debaters also misunderstood the effect of apportionment. Hugh Williamson, a North Carolina delegate to the Philadelphia convention, favored apportionment on the ground that
the rule would protect his poorer state. Land taxes had to be apportioned according to the number of inhabitants, he wrote. "Is
it not a pleasing consideration," he asked, "that North-Carolina,
under her natural disadvantages, must have the same facility of
paying her share of the public debt as the most favored, or the
most fortunate State?" 14 In fact, if North Carolina were a disadvantaged state, as Williamson said, she would have lower "facility" of paying her quota and would have to bear higher tax rates
than more advantaged states. Tax rates would have to be higher
on land in North Carolina because North Carolina as a poor
state would have less value in land over which to spread its
quota. Apportionment hurts rather than helps poor states.
In a 1792 congressional debate, Hugh Williamson opposed a
federal subsidy on cod fishing boats on the grounds that it in effect
made the tax burden unequal across the states. He argued that
"the present Constitution would never had been adopted" had
not it contained the uniformity requirement and the apportionment requirement. 145 These safeguards, he said, prevented Congress from imposing unequal burdens or gratifying one part of the
Union by oppressing another. 146 A difficulty with the argument is
that uniformity and apportionment are not parallel safeguards but
inconsistent. It is of course possible to apportion some taxes and
have uniform rates for others, but one cannot have both apportionment and uniform rates for the same tax. If uniformity of rates
is a wise requirement, which was Williamson's primary pitch
against the cod subsidy, then apportionment cannot be.
3. Protection for Slaveholders?

Madison argued in the Virginia ratification convention that
apportionment would prevent taxation of slaves. The argument
was cleverly used to convince slaveholders to ratify, but it is false
to both the history and the text. At the convention, Anti144.

Hugh Williamson, Remarks on the Plan of Government (1788) reprinted in

FRIENDS OF THE CONSTITUTION: WRITINGS OF THE OTHER FEDERALISTS: 1787-1788

(Callen A. Sheehan and Gary L. McDowell, eds. 1998).
145. Hugh Williamson, Speech to the U.S. House of Representatives (Feb. 7, 1792)
in 3 ANNALS 379-380.
146. !d.
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Federalist Patrick Henry opposed the Constitution on the
ground that Congress could use its tax power to force manumission.147 Madison responded that apportionment would protect
slavery from high taxes. Congress could not annihilate slavery by
taxation, Madison claimed, because the "taxation of the State (is
to be] equal only to its representation. " 148 Other Virginia Federalists agreed that Congress could not tax slaves at so high a rate
as to amount to emancipation because "taxation and representation were fixed by the Constitution according to the census," so
that Congress could not tax slaves out of existence "without ruining free people in other states." 149 Anti-Federalists Patrick
Henry and George Mason replied, quite correctly, that they
could see no color to the argument that apportionment gave security to slavery. The state's quota of an apportioned or direct
tax was to be determined in proportion to population, they argued, but Congress would still set the objects of tax within the
state. Once a state's quantum was fixed, Congress could require
the full amount to be laid on slaves alone. 150 Madison was wrong
and Mason and Henry were right. Apportionment affects only
the allocation of taxes among the states and has no effect objects
of taxes within the state. Congress could have required that Virginia pay its entire quota by taxing only its slaves at prohibitive
rates. The constitutional text gave Congress the power to target
slaves through taxation even to the point of manumission.

147. Patrick Henry, Debate in the Virginia Convention (June 17, 1788), in 10
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 1341-1342 (arguing that Congress might lay such heavy taxes
on slaves, amounting to emancipation, such "that this property would be lost to this
country").
148. James Madison, Speech to the Virginia Convention (June 17, 1787) in 3
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 1339 (arguing that apportionment will prevent Congress from
imposing oppressive taxes on tobacco or slaves that Northern states would escape); see
also James Madison, Debate in the Virginia Ratification Convention (June 12,1788), in 3
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 1204 (arguing that our State is secured because its proportion
of tax shall be commensurate to its population); James Madison, Debate in the Virginia
Ratification Convention (June 17,1788), in 3 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 1342-43 (arguing
that the census was intended to introduce equality into the burdens to be laid on the
community). See also John Taylor, An Argument Concerning the Constitutionality fo the
Carriage Tax at 20, 13, 14, quoted in 4 PRACTICE OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra note
124, at 321 (arguing that if apportionment is not required of direct excise taxes, then the
whole burden of government could be exclusively laid on slave-holding states).
149. George Nichols, Speech to the Ratification Convention (June 17, 1787), in 3
ELLIOT'S DEBATES 457; "The State Soldier IV," VIRGINIA INDEPENDENT CHRONICLE
(Mar. 19, 1788), reprinted in 8 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 509,511.
150. Patrick Henry, Speech to the Ratification Convention (June 17, 1787) in 3
ELLIOT'S DEBATES 457; George Mason, Speech to the Ratification Convention (June 17,
1787) m 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES 458.
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Slaveholders later argued that apportionment was adopted to
prevent "any special tax upon negro slaves" 151 or indeed to prevent a tax on slaves. 152 This position drew support from Madison's
argument that apportionment would prevent a high tax on slaves.
Constitutional history shows that the argument is exactly backwards. Apportionment of tax, counting slaves at three-fifths, was
adopted to discourage slavery, not to protect it. Madison later argued that we should look to the ratification debates to fill out the
meaning of the text of the Constitution. 153 Arguments for impossible things and arguments that misdescribe both the text and the
history, however, are entitled to no credence.
4. Prevent "Blatantly Sectional" Taxes?

Professor Erik Jensen has recently argued that apportionment blocks "blatantly sectional" federal taxes and allows "only
those levies with uniformly distributed bases-'equal per capita
among the states."' 154 For example, if Congress proposed a tax
on dogsleds, the impact of the tax would be felt almost entirely
in Alaska, even if the tax had a uniform rate. "If the dogsled tax
is considered direct, however," Jensen argues, "the apportionment rule would require that Mississippi citizens also bear a proportionate share of the total tax burden (measured by Mississippi's percentage of the national population)... and the
enthusiasm of Mississip~i Congressmen ... for the tax would be
substantially lessened. " 1 5
Preventing blatantly sectional taxes would have been a very
plausible constitutional value. Delegates to the Convention
complained bitterly whenever they detected an~ possibility of
discriminatory impact against their home states. 1 6 The difficulty
is that apportionment of tax does not prevent discrimination.
151. Abraham Baldwin (Ga.), Debates in the U.S. House of Representatives (Feb.
12, 1790), in 1 ANNALS 1243.
152. Abraham Baldwin (Ga.), Debates in the U.S. House of Representatives (Feb.
12, 1796), in 12 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS 309
(Helen Veit ed., 1994) (direct tax clause prevents a tax on slaves).
153. James Madison, Speech in the U.S. House of Representatives (Apr. 6, 1796), in
3 FARRAND's RECORDS 374. (saying that if we look the meaning beyond the face of the
instrument, we must look for it, not in the Philadelphia Convention, which proposed the
Constitution but in the state conventions which accepted and ratified it).
154. Erik Jensen, The Constitlttion Matters in Taxation, 100 TAX NOTES 821, 825
(2003).
155. ld.
156. Oliver Ellsworth, Debate in the Connecticut Ratification Convention (Jan. 7,
1788) in 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES 192 (saying that the people of Connecticut pay more than
$50,000 annually into New York's treasury by reason of the New York impost on harbor
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First, Congress could enact a prohibitive excise tax on dogsleds (or slaves), even if it were sectional in impact. The first
definition of excise tax in the constitutional era was the whiskey
tax, but the existing taxes called "Excises" also reached other
similar objects "for the Suppression of Immorality, Luxury
and Extravagance." Both slaves and dogsleds can be defined as
either immoral or extravagant. Even if you define excises as like
sales taxes, as Professor Jensen would, Congress can still impose
prohibitive tax rates solely on sales of slaves or dogsleds. Excises, after all, were originally supposed to discourage immorality, luxury, and extravagance. For much of our history, tariffs on
imports were set high enough to foreclose any foreign competition as to the taxed item. 157 However excises are defined, in any
event, an excise tax can have a prohibitively high rate, so long as
the rate chosen is uniform across states.
If excises were not available, moreover, Congress could
adopt an apportioned tax on slaves or dogsleds without any serious impediment. An apportioned tax on dogsleds would be a
dead letter in Mississippi, just as a slave tax could not have been
collected in Maine, but dead-letter taxes that could not be collected were normal in the founding era. 158 The apportioned dogsled tax would be collected in Alaska, perhaps at high rates,
without affecting any other state, and that would satisfy apportionment. Congress could say that a state's entire quota must fall
on slaves or on dogsleds. Except for the specifically prohibited
tax on exports, Congress can impose any kind of tax it wants.
Apportionment, moreover, does not affect how a total tax
burden falls. There is no requirement under the apportionment
clause that the tax burden be apportioned across the states by
population, as Professor Jensen says, but only that a direct tax be
apportioned. Any one listening to the constitutional debates
would think that a "direct tax" would be rare. The Federalists
promised that they would avoid direct taxes except in emergencies
traffic); George Mason, Debate in the Federal Convention (Sept. 15, 1787) in 2
FARRAND'S RECORDS 631 (arguing that allowing Congress to enact a navigation act by
mere majority vote, giving certain shippers a monopoly, would enable a few rich merchants in Philadelphia, New York, and Boston to reduce the value of Southern staples by
half); Governeur Morris, Debate in the Federal Convention (July 17, 1787) in 2
FARRAND'S RECORDS 26 (describing state paper money as a trick, "by which Citizens of
other States may be affected").
157. See, e.g., G. R. Hawke, infra note 216 (estimating U.S. tariffs at over 100% of
value in the late nineteenth century).
158. See, e.g., STANLEY ELKINS & ERICK MCKITRICK, THE AGE OF FEDERALISM
469 (1993) (saying that the state whiskey taxes of the 1780s were a virtual dead letter in
the West all along).
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because they were so hard to collect. The term "direct taxes" was
collapsing on itself during the Constitutional Era, shedding "duties" and "excises," even by reason of the Constitution itself.
There was no assurance that any tax would be apportioned, much
less that the "total tax burden" would be apportioned.
Professor Jensen's filter is ultimately so fine that it excludes
all taxes except a tax the Founders renounced. Professor Jensen
says that the purpose of apportionment is to require Congress to
impose only those levies with uniformly distributed bases"equal per capita among the states." The only tax base that is
strictly equal per capita among the states, counting slaves at
three-fifths, is a head tax, but the Founders denounced the the
head tax as "odious," "distressful," "abhorrent to the feelings of
human nature," and "unfriendly to manufacture and injurious to
the industrious poor." 159
The apportionment requirement does not prevent taxes
with disparate sectional impact. The only remaining effect is to
kill federal taxes that a democracy might otherwise use. Professor Jensen may not mind that his filter kills all taxes, except one
that is politically impossible, but the Founders would definitely
have minded. The primary purpose of the Constitution was to
raise revenue to pay war debts.
Professor Jensen claims that he alone is taking the Constitution seriously-that "the Constitution matters in tax." 160 "Even
imperfect provisions" [like apportionment], he argues, "should
be interpreted in as robust a way as possible." 161 That is nonsense. Tax and apportionment are inconsistent, sometimes and
perhaps always. Apportionment kills every tax, except those that
politics will kill. Thanks to the inconsistency, you cannot avoid
nullification, no matter how badly you want to preserve all parts
of the Constitution, because one side or the other of the inconsistency has to disappear. To escape a constitutional inconsistency, you need to weigh the importance of the two sides and
preserve the more important.
As soon as you weigh tax and apportionment together, apportionment is gone. Apportionment was a chip given to the North to
acquiesce in allowing the South to count its slaves in determining
representation in the House. When slavery ended, so ended the historical purpose of apportionment. Raising federal revenue to pay
159.
160.
161.

See supra note 137.
Jensen, The Consciwcion Maccers in Tax, supra note 1.
!d. at 824.
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war debts, by contrast, was the major purpose of the Constitution
and it continues to have considerable importance.
Professor Jensen also concludes that he is not arguing that
Constitution requires an impotent national revenue system, because the Sixteenth Amendment unquestionably allows Congress to enact an unapportioned income tax. 162 This issue, however, had to be settled before 1913 when the Sixteenth
Amendment was ratified and when no income tax would be
available. The resolution between tax and apportionment
reached before 1913, moreover, would govern after 1913, because the Sixteenth Amendment is a pro-tax amendment. It does
authorize an income tax, but it can not be interpreted to kill everything but the income tax.
C. HEROIC HYLTON

In the 1796 case of Hylton v. United States, 163 the Supreme
Court held that a tax on carriages was not a direct tax on the
ground that apportionment of the tax was not reasonable. The
Court reasoned that if New York had ten times more carriages
per capita than Virginia, tax rates to meet apportionment would
have to be ten times higher in Virginia than in New York. The
Court saw the stupidity of that result, and it rejected the apportionment rule that would require it.
Alexander Hamilton argued on behalf of the government in
Hylton. Hamilton had long ago decided that apportionment under any formula could not reach the wealth of the nation. 164 Apportionment in the form of requisitions had failed utterly. 165 The
Founders felt the desperate need for federal taxes to restore the
public credit, in order to defend the nation from the rapacious
empires of England, Spain, and France. Hamilton had borne the
awesome responsibility of finding enough taxes, by smoke and
mirrors if need be, to convince the Dutch and other foreign lenders that the country could pay its debts in an orderly fashion. 166
162. /d. at 842-43.
163. 3 U.S. 171 (1796).
164. THE FEDERALIST No. 21 at 101 (Alexander Hamilton) (Dec. 12, 1787) (saying
that no formula for apportioning taxes among the states could equitably capture the
wealth of the nation because the factors that contributed to wealth were "too complex,
minute, or adventitious to admit of a particular specification").
165. See. e.g., ROGER H. BROWN, REDEEMING THE REPUBLIC: FEDERALISTS,
TAXATION, AND THE ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION 26 (1993).
166. James C. Riley, Foreign Credit and Fiscal Stability: Dutch Investment in the
United States, 1781-1794, 65 J. AM. HIST. 654, 664-68,672-75 (1978) (arguing that American taxes d1d not grow enough to carry the interest on American debt until the impost
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Hamilton argued that the nation was threatened by war 167 and
that public credit was essential to public safety. 168 War debt was
also "the price of liberty," as Hamilton put it, for which "the
faith of America has been repeatedly pledged." 169 Finding federal taxes to pay the war debts represented the highest ideals of
preserving the nation and the republican form of government. 170
Hamilton argued that the federal carriage tax was not a direct tax because "no construction ought to prevail calculated to
defeat the express and necessary authority of the government."171 "It would be contrary to reason," he said, "and to
every rule of sound construction, to adopt a principle for regulating the exercise of a clear constitutional power which would defeat the exercise of the power." 172 The argument had been critical to Congress's adoption of the tax. 173
The Supreme Court agreed that if apportionment was not
reasonable, the tax was not direct:
The Constitution evidently contemplated no taxes as direct
taxes but only such as Congress could lay in proportion to the
census. The rule of apportionment is only to be adopted in
such cases where it can reasonably apply; and the subject
174
taxed, must ever determine the application of the rule.

grew sufficiently by 1796, but that the Dutch fooled themselves with Hamilton's taxes
into extending more credit).
167. THE FEDERALIST No. 31, at 149 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jan. 1, 1788) (saying
that national defense can "know no other bounds than the exigencies of the nation and
the resources of the community"); THE FEDERALIST No. 34, at 161 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jan. 5, 1788) ("to model our political systems upon speculations of lasting tranquility, is to calculate on the weaker springs of the human character"); see also James Wilson,
Speech to the Pennsylvania Ratification Convention (Dec. 11, 1787) in 2 FARRAND'S
RECORDS 526 ("The prospect of a war was highly probable").
168. THE FEDERALIST NO. 30, at 146-47 (Alexander Hamilton) (Dec. 28, 1787).
168. ld.
169. Alexander Hamilton, "Report Relative for a Provision for the Support of Public
Credit" (1790) in 6 HAMILTON PAPERS 69.
170. See, e.g, Report of the Board of Treasury (Feb. 8, 1786), in 30 JCC 54, 57 (saying that states failure to pay apportioned quotas threatened not only "the existence of the
Union, but of those great and invaluable privileges, for which they have so arduously and
honorably contended").
171. Alexander Hamilton, Law Brief on the Carriage Tax, Hylton v. United States
(1795) reprinted in 7 THE WORKS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 845,846 (John C. Hamilton, ed., 1851 ).
172. ld.
173. Theodore Sedgwick (Mass.), Debate in the U.S. House of Representatives
(May 6, 1794) in 4 ELLIOT's DEBATES 433 (arguing that "the legislature was authorized
to impose a tax on ... carriages" and that because a tax on carriages "could not be apportioned by the constitutional ratio, it would follow, irresistibly, that such a tax, ... was not
'direct"').
174. Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. 171, 174 (1796) (Chase, J.) (emphasis omitted).
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Alternatively stated, "[a]s all direct taxes must be apportioned, it
is evident that the Constitution contemplated none as direct but
such as could be apportioned." 175 A tax on carriages was deemed
to be not a direct tax as a matter of law so that it would not have
to be apportioned.
The Hylton rationale remained good constitutional doctrine
for a hundred years. In 1868, for example, the Supreme Court
held that a Civil War tax on the income and principal of insurance companies was constitutional although not apportioned.
The tax was not direct because the apportionment would yield
an unacceptable consequence:
The consequences, which would follow the apportionment of
the tax ... in the manner prescribed by the Constitution, must
not be overlooked. They are very obvious. Where [insurance]
corporations are numerous and rich, it might be light; where
none exist, it could not be collected; where they are few and
poor, it would fall upon them with such weight as to involve
annihilation. It cannot be supposed that the framers of the
Constitution intended that any tax should be apportioned, the
collection of which on that principle would be attended with
such results. The consequences are fatal to the proposition. 176

In Scholey v. Rew, 177 decided in 1875, the Court held on the same
logic that a tax on wealth transmitted at death was not direct:
If all taxes that political economists regard as direct taxes should

be held to fall within those words in the Constitution, Congress
would be deprived of the practical power to impose such taxes,
and the taxing power would be . . . crippled; for no Congress
would dare to apportion, for instance, the income tax. 178

Scholey shows that Hylton was based upon the adoption of a
functional analysis and not on a crude invocation of categories of
tax. In the period just before the adoption of the Constitution,
"direct tax" had included the estate tax. 179
175. Hylton, 3 U.S. at 181 (Iredell, J.) (emphasis in original); see also id. at 179
(Paterson, 1.) ("A tax on carriages, if apportioned, would be oppressive and pernicious");
cf Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust, 158 U.S. 429, 687 (Brown, 1., dissenting) ("[I]t as
very clear that the clause requiring direct taxes to be apportioned to the population has
no application to taxes which are not capable of apportionment according to population").
176. Pacific Ins. Co. v. Soule, 74 U.S. 433, 446 (1868).
177. 90 u.s. 331 (1875).
178. /d. at 343.
179. Letter of Rufus King to John Adams (Oct. 3, 1786), in 23 LEITERS OF
DELEGATES 581 (saying that the sum, excepting dollars "which are raised by Imposts &
Excises, must be raised from the People by an immediate and direct apportionment upon
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Finally, in Springer v. United States, 180 the Court held in
1881 on the logic and authority of Hylton that the Civil War income tax on individuals was not direct:
It was well held [in Hylton] that where such evils would attend

the apportionment of a tax, the Constitution could not have
intended that an apportionment should be made. This view
applies with even greater force to the [income] tax in question
in this case. Where the population is large and the incomes
are few and small, it would be intolerably oppressive. 181

For the first hundred years of the Constitution's history, venomous apportionment was rendered harmless.
III. THE RISE AND FALL OF THE JUDICIAL
VETOONTAX
A. POLLOCK COMES INTO THE GARDEN

In the 1895 case of Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 182
the Supreme Court overruled Hylton and its successor cases by a
5-4 margin. Without citing Hylton, Pollock required the federal
income tax to be apportioned. Apportionment is silly for an income tax because per capita income is not equal among the
states. Tax rates under apportionment would have to be higher
in poorer states. Apportionment might even be impossible in a
mobile economy, especially one with corporate taxpayers and
integrated national businesses, because it is impossible to ascertain the state quota to which various tax payments should be
credited. Harangued b~ the taxpayer's lawyer that the income
tax was communistic, 1 however, the Supreme Court made it
impossible to impose the tax. The Pollock majority invented a
false history and rationale for apportionment, saying that the
rule was designed "to prevent an attack upon accumulated property by mere force of numbers." 184 Justice Field announced,
apocalyptically, that the income tax's
assault upon capital is but the beginning. It will be but the
the Polls & Estates of the Inhabitants" (emphasis added)).
180. 102 u.s. 586 (1881).
181. !d. at 600.
182. 157 u.s. 429 (1895).
183. !d. at 532 (argument of Joseph Choate, attorney for appellant Pollock) (saying
that income tax is "communistic in its purposes and tendencies" and was defended before
the Court by principles of communism).
184. !d. at 583.
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stepping-stone to others, larger and more sweeping, till our
political contests will become a war of the poor against the
rich-a war constantly growing in intensity and bitterness. 'If
the court sanctions the [graduated income tax,], it will mark
the hour when the sure decadence of our present government
will commence.' 185
Apportionment, the majority opinion said, was "one of the bul186
warks of private rights and private property."
While preventing a tax on accumulated wealth might well
have expressed the intent of the Pollock majority, that intent
turned the historical meaning on its head. Apportionment by
population was originally a means to reach wealth by taxing according to relative wealth of the states. The Founders believed in
wealth taxes. The most significant wealth of the time lay in land,
and land taxes were the primary sources of government revenue.187 When Hamilton asked Madison, for instance, for recommendations on taxes the new government should impose, Madison advised a federal tax on land as "an essential branch of
national revenue ... before a preoccupancy by the States becomes an impediment." 188 The Founders often expressed
sympathy with the aristocratic notions that those "who own
the country ought to govern it" 189 and that wealth, representation, and taxes should go together. 190 Within those premises,
however, the wealthy of the country would pay its taxes.
Pollock seems to be a victim of a bad reading of the Constitution. The text says that taxes of a certain kind must be apportioned among the states according to population. From apportionment according to population, the Justices reverseengineered a rationale that apportionment must have been in185. !d. at 607.
186. !d. at 583.
187. See, e.g., the Treasury survey of state taxes in 1796, which includes land taxes in
all thirteen states. Wolcott, Direct Taxes, supra note 88, at 418-41.
188. Letter from James Madison to Alexander Hamilton (Nov. 19, 1789), in 12
MADISON PAPERS 449-50.
189. See, e.g., Richard Hofstadter, The Founding Fathers: An Age of Realism, in THE
MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 73, 84 (Robert H. Horwitz, ed.,
1977) (quoting John Jay).
190. MADISON, JULY 11, 1787, IN CONVENTION (1787), reprinted in 1 FARRAND'S
RECORDS: THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1887 at 585 (Max Farrand
ed., 1911) ("It was said that Representation & taxation were to go together; that taxation
& wealth ought to go together"); accord, id at 563 (Rufus King: Mass. Federalist); id. at
601 (Elbridge Gerry: Mass. Anti-Federalist); MADISON, AUGUST 7, 1787, IN
CONVENTION (1787), reprinted in 2 FARRAND'S RECORDS: THE RECORDS OF THE
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1887 at 202 (Max Farrand ed., 1911) (Oliver Ellsworth: Conn.
Federalist).
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tended to protect wealthy states from populous states. When the
income tax came into effect after the Sixteenth Amendment,
three-quarters of its revenue came from just eight rich states.
New York alone would pay thirty-five percent of the income
tax. 191 If rich states had a right to avoid tax, that right cried for a
remedy. If the right of wealthy states was important, then narrow
interpretations should be avoided. If the wealthy states were to
be protected, then the clause must have been intended "to prevent an attack upon accumulated property by mere force of
numbers." 192 A tax that fell disproportionately on wealth, such as
the income tax, must have been the kind of tax that apportionment was meant to prohibit.
The difficulty with this argument is that both the rationale
and the consequent right are contrived. Apportionment by
population was originally intended to be a measurement of
wealth of a state. Apportionment had nothing to do with taxes
within a state. Having set the quota for a state, Congress can
make the tax payable only by the wealthy, perhaps by one person, without violating apportionment. Because the Founders
treated population solely as the measure of wealth, historically
accurate thinking would treat the wealthy and the populous
states as the same, within an acceptable margin of error. Apportionment by population was a mere proxy for wealth. If New
York were wealthier, then the historical purpose of apportionment was to make New York pay more tax. Pollock turned the
historical meaning of the apportionment requirement upsidedown.
Pollock also said that the purpose of apportionment was to
prevent the imposition of tax on a single state by an overall national majority: "Nothing can be clearer than that what the Constitution intended to guard against was the exercise by the general government of the power of directly taxing persons and
property within any State through a majority made up from the
other States. " 193 This language has no constitutional justification.
An overall majority in both the House and the Senate can adopt
federal taxes, and apportionment does nothing to change that.
There is no requirement that a state must agree to a federal tax
for individuals within the state to be subject to the tax, and there
is no immunity from a federal tax if a majority within a state re191.
192.
193.

JOHN D. 8UENKER, INCOME TAX AND THE PROGRESSIVE ERA 10 (1985).

Pollock, 157 U.S. at 583.
!d. at 582
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jects the tax. The Constitution, more generally, does not give
each state some kind of Calhounian veto on federal legislation.
The Constitution created not a compact among states, but a federal government resting directly on the sovereignty of the people
and able to raise revenue without the states' approval. 194 If Congress passes a tax, it does not matter what a state thinks.
Finally, as a matter of history apportionment was adopted
to decrease Southern incentive to increase slaves to increase representation in Congress; to interpret apportionment as having
any broader purpose than as an anti-slavery provision is to rip
apportionment out of its historical context and to destroy its
original meaning.
B. POLLOCK BEATEN BACK

Pollock soon lost both legal and political legitimacy. The
Court expanded the definition of "excise tax" to avoid apportionment in any tax case that came before it. Even the income
tax could qualify as an excise. Elite opinion also turned against
the case, and the income tax won support deep within the heart
of the Republican Party. In the end Congress and the states
overwhelmingly adopted the Sixteenth Amendment. All parties
and geographical sections chose to allow federal tax without apportionment, even an income tax.

1. The Judicial Withering of Pollock
Almost immediately the Supreme Court began retreating
from what it later called Pollock's "mistaken theory." 195 The
Court expanded the definition of "excise tax" elastically so that
it could swallow the world of federal tax. "Excise" was a narrow
term at the time of the Constitution. It referred foremost to the
whiskey tax. Beyond whiskey, it referred mostly to sin and luxury taxes, enacted to suppress vice and encourage righteousness.
In reaction to Pollock, however, the Court expanded "excise"
dramatically. Four years after Pollock, the Court held that a
trade tax on the Chicago Board of Trade was an excise tax. 196
Five years after Pollock, the Court held that the graduated es194. James Wilson, Debate in the Pennsylvania Ratification Convention (Dec. 11,
1787) in 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES 502 (arguing that the states had no sovereignty because the
principle of this Constitution is that "the supreme power resides in the people").
195. Stanton v. Baltic Mining Co., 240 U.S. 103, 113 (1916).
196. Nicol v. Ames, 173 U.S. 509,519 (1899) (holding that a tax on the use rather
than the mere ownership of property was an "excise").
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tate tax was an excise tax. 197 If the Pollock Court had thought in
1895 that it could protect accumulated capital from congressional assault, the Court's decision in 1900 that Congress could
enact a graduated estate tax terminated that rationale. In 1904,
the Supreme Court held that a tax on a corporation's gross receipts was an excise tax that did not have to be apportioned. 198
That decision, in turn, justified a tax on the net income of a corporation, although the decision did not come down until 1911,
after Congress had passed the Sixteenth Amendment. 199 A tax
on corporate business receipts or a corporate income tax is at
least as much an assault on accumulated wealth as an individual
income tax.
Cordell Hull thought that the Court would also allow an individual income tax. After all, he wrote, if the corporate tax
could be justified as a tax on doing business as a corporation,
then why could a tax on individual income not be justified as a
tax on doing business as an individual? 200 Even conservative
Senator Nelson Aldrich of Rhode Island said he considered the
corporate tax to be an income tax, except for the name. 201 The
excise taxes on stock trades, gross receipts of a corporation, and
estates surely already had very little resemblance to a whiskey
tax, so that "excise tax" looked like an infinitely malleable term
used functionally simply to avoid apportionment.
By 1929, the Court summarized the excise tax exemption
excusing from apportionment "a tax imposed upon a particular
use of property or the exercise of a single power over property
incidental to ownership." 202 The use-versus-mere-ownership rationale was itself an opportunistic rationale, albeit an old one. It
arose only after the founding period, and only after Congress
had realized that apportionment was a hobble and thus sought to
invent narrow definitions of "direct tax." 203 Even though all of
197. Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41, 78 (1900). The Pollock Court itself had distinguished the income tax from a tax on "business, privileges, or employments" saying that
the latter might be constitutional as an excise tax. Pollock, 158 U.S. at 635.
198. Spreckels Sugar Refining Co. v. McClain, 192 U.S. 397 (1904).
199. Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107, 150 (1911) (holding that the corporate
income tax was not imposed on the mere ownership of property, but upon the conducting
of a business in corporate form).
200.
201.
202.
203.

MEMOIRS OF CORDELL HULL 66 (1948).
44 CONG. REC. 4232 (1909).
Bromley v. McCaughn, 280 U.S. 124, 136 (1929).

The apparent earliest use of the use-versus-mere-ownership distinction occurred in 1794, when Representative Fisher Ames of Massachusetts argued in Congress
that a tax on carriages was an excise tax because "the duty falls not on the possession, but
the use." 4 ANNALS 729 (1794). By 1794, it was known that apportionment was an obsta-
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these cases represented heroic expansions of the original meaning of "excise" and reflected the opportunistic use of words to
limit Pollock to its facts, the excise cases were properly decided
because it was Pollock that was illegitimate.
2. The Political Withering of PolloclC04

Thanks to the Court's dramatic expansion of the "excise"
tax exception to apportionment, the only important tax that remained apportionable by the time Congress began considering
the Sixteenth Amendment was the individual income tax itself.
The only reason that Pollock was not challenged on the income
tax itself was continuing respect for the Supreme Court as an institution, despite its error in Pollock. The Sixteenth Amendment, proposed by Congress in 1909 and ratified in 1913, overruled Pollock in its last significant redoubt.
The 1894 income tax, declared unconstitutional in Pollock,
was a Democratic Party bill that drew almost no support from
Republicans. Party rhetoric and behavior, however, were "demilitarized" as the country moved from the angry disputes of the
Populist 1890s into the Progressive Era after the turn of the century.205 Vehement opposition to the income tax on principle,
which had characterized the Republican dissent in 1894 and the
Pollock decision itself, disappeared. When the partisan anger
subsided, Republicans accepted the income tax, at least as a
cle and Ames was looking for a new, narrow definition of direct tax that would allow the
federal government to raise revenue without apportionment. Madison disagreed with the
claimed definition. !d. Since carriage taxes were listed in the Treasury inventory of direct
taxes at the time, Madison had the better of the argument, at least before Hylton held
that the consequences of unreasonable consequences of apportionment rendered a tax
not direct. Hylton itself involved carriages for hire and for personal usc, and the tax fell
on the carriage no matter what its use.
204. My interpretation of the politics of the income tax owes a great deal to Charles
V. Stewart, The Federal Income Tax and the Realignment of the 1890s, REALIGNMENT IN
AMERICAN POLITICS: TOWARD A THEORY 263 (Bruce A. Campbell and Richard J. Trilling eds. 1980) (showing generally how elite opinion came to accept the income tax, albeit
as a supplement to other taxes). Alternative explanations not endorsed here include
Bennett D. Baack & Edward John Ray, Special Interests and the Adoption of the Income
Tax in the United State, 45 1. ECON. HIST. 607 (1985) (arguing from a public choice perspective that political pressure for a reduction in tariffs did not lead to a reduction in
government spending, as it should have, because of popular support for a naval build-up
and for Civil War veterans' pensions); ROBERT A. STANLEY, DIMEl'OSIONS OF LAW IN
THE SERVICE OF ORDER: ORIGINS OF THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX, 1861-1913 (1993)
(downplaying progressive sources of the income tax and attributing the income tax instead to conservatives' defense of statist capitalism against attack by the working class
and by radicals).
205. WALTER DEAN BURNHAM, CRITICAL ELECTIONS AND THE MAINSPRI:SGS OF
AMERICAN POLITICS 72-74 (1970).
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modest part within a package of other federal taxes. Republicans
accepted the income tax once it no longer seemed to threaten
massive redistribution and once the Democratic Party ceased
threatening class warfare. Elite opinion turned against Pollock
and the tax-killing apportionment rule, both within the law and
within politics. The Sixteenth Amendment, allowing the income
tax without apportionment, passed through Congress and was
ratified in the states overwhelmingly.
The 1894 income tax was an unimportant part of a bill that
principally concerned federal tariffs. Both major parties in the
1880s and 1890s favored the federal tarift_2°6 There had been an
income tax on the Union side of the Civil War, but it lapsed in
1872?07 With the lapse of the Civil War income tax, federal
revenue came first from tariffs and then from tobacco and whiskey.208 Tariff policy was an intensely fought partisan issue, but
only within narrow bounds: The Republicans believed in high
tariffs to protect domestic industry from foreign competition,
and the Democrats believed in tariffs, but solely in amounts
needed by federal programs.
Republican William McKinley, the victorious presidential
candidate in 1896 and 1900, argued from the start of his career
that protectionist tariffs raised the wages of industrial workers.
"Reduce the tariff," he said, "and labor is the first to suffer." 209
McKinley argued that nobody cared whether consumer prices
went down if workers did not have wages to pay them and that
the tariff was paid not by American consumers but by foreign
competitors. McKinley was said to find in "the dull tax schedules
that bored other men ... the romance of history in the unfolding
of the nation's wealth." 210 Less sympathetically, economist W.
Elliot Brownlee has argued that Congressmen achieved political

206. RICHARD FRANKLIN BENSEL, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF AMERICAN
INDUSTRIALIZATION, 1877-1900, at 457-509 (2000) (analyzes voting patterns on tariffs by
region and party from 1878-1897); SIDNEY RATNER, AMERICAN TAXATION: ITS
HISTORY AS A SOCIAL FORCE IN DEMOCRACY 147-50, 160-66 (1942) (discusses the
Populist Party's endorsement of the income tax before 1894).
207. For a description of the Civil War income tax, see RATNER, supra note 206, at
79-86, 89-90, 97-98, 134-35. Ratner estimates that less than 1% of the population had income over the exemptions so as to be exposed to the tax. /d. at 143.
208. See Table Y258-263: Federal Government Receipts 1789-1957, U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES, COLONIAL TIMES TO 1957,
at 712 (1980). In 1893, for example, $203,355,000 came from tariffs and of $161,028,000
came from federal alcohol, tobacco, and stamp taxes.
209. H. WAYNE MORGAN, WILLIAM MCKINLEY AND HIS AMERICA 60-62 (1963).
210. /d. at 60-63.
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power by manipulating complicated tariff schedules to subsidize
favored industries. 211
The Democratic Party's traditional position, from the time
that Jefferson reEealed all internal taxes when he was first
elected President, 12 was that Congress should rely exclusively on
tariffs. Democrat Grover Cleveland, elected President in 1884
and again in 1892, argued not against tariffs in principle, but only
that federal tariffs should not be so high as to yield a surplus
over the government's needs. 213
The income tax of 1894 that the Court struck down was a
small part of an attempt to achieve a modest reduction in tariffs. It
was tacked onto the Wilson-Gorman Tariff Act of 1894 by Democrats alone, without the help of either Republicans or the conservative Democratic President, Grover Cleveland. The tax imitated the Civil War income tax, but with a higher exemption and a
flat 2% tax after the exemption, so that well under 1% of the
population would pay the tax. 214 The Wilson-Gorman Tariff Act,
to which the income tax was attached, shuffled tariffs, reduced
some rates, and exempted some new goods from tariff, but it also
increased tariff rates elsewhere. 215 Real tariff rates were high100% of real value according to one estimate-and, notwithstanding the shuffling, remained high throughout the period. 216
If the income tax had been allowed to reduce tariffs significantly, that would have improved the wealth of the nation. Economics routinely teaches that a nation maximizes its well-being
by buying the highest quality goods at the lowest price, even if
the goods are produced abroad, and by putting its labor and re211. W. ELLIOT BROWNLEE, FEDERAL TAXATION IN AMERICA: A SHORT HISTORY
35 (1996).
212. See THOMAS JEFFERSON, First Annual Message to Congress, in 1 BASIC
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 335, 337 (PhilipS. Foner, ed., 1944) (calling for the
elimination of internal taxes, comprehending excises, stamp, auction, license, and carriage taxes). See generally DUMAS MALONE, JEFFERSON THE PRESIDENT: FIRST TERM,
1801-1805100-01 (1948).
213. Grover Cleveland, Third Annual Message (Dec. 6, 1887), in 2 STATE OF THE
UNION MESSAGES OF THE PRESIDENTS, 1790-1966, at 1587-88 (Fred Israel ed.) (1966)
(objecting to a $140,000,000 federal surplus).
214. Descriptions of adoption of the 1894 income tax included STEVEN R. WEISMAN,
THE GREAT TAX WARS: LINCOLN TO WILSON 105-46 (2002) and RATNER, supra note
206, at 160-92. The $4000 exemption is estimated to have left only 85,000 taxpayers or
0.14%, exempting 99.86% of the population. BROWNLEE, supra note 211, at 38.
215. RATNER, supra note 206, at 174-184; CLARENCE STERN, PROTECTIONIST
REPUBLICANISM: REPUBLICAN TARIFF POLICY IN THE MCKINLEY PERIOD 44-53
(1971).
216. G. R. Hawke, The United States Tariff and Industrial Protection in the Late
Nineteenth Century, 28 ECON. HIST. REV. 84,96 (1975).
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sources into a domestic enterprise where some comparative advantage allows the nation to make the largest possible profit
from limited national resources. Tariff-free trade is part of the
larger idea of the benefit of division of labor. 217 If economists
agree on anything, it is wobably on the desirability of free trade
unhampered by tariffs. 2
In 1894, however, the income tax was an inflammatory issue. The opposition in the debates framed its position around
supposedly eternal principles. The opposition neither sought nor
welcomed maneuver or compromise. The 1894 income tax struck
down in Pollock was a Democratic Party bill that drew almost no
support from the Republican Party.219
By end of 1894, however, the Democratic Party that sponsored the income tax ceased to be the majority party. Starting
with the Panic of 1893, the country went into a decade-long depression. At worst, unemployment reached 20% and the economy performed 25% under capacity. 220 The Democratic Party,
having been in control of the Congress and the presidency, received the blame. In the congressional elections of 1894, the
Democrats dropped from 62% to 29% of the seats in the House
of ReJ?resentatives, the largest single change in seats in U.S. history.2 1 In 1896, the Democrats nominated populist William
Jennings Bryan over the conservative incumbent Grover Cleveland. Bryan, however, ran on a platform of minimal government,
general distrust of urbanization and industrialization, and inflation to relieve farmers' debts. None of those planks appealed to
urban voters or immigrants. Cities that had always voted Democratic voted Republican for the first time in 1896. 222
217. See, e.g., F.W. TAUSSIG, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 481-524 (4th ed. 1946).
218. JANE GRAVELLE, THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF TAXING CAPITAL INCOME 226
(1994). See also Richard C. Edwards, Economic Sophistication in Nineteenth Century
Congressional Tariff Debates, 30 1. ECON. HIST. 802, 823 (1970) (calling the 1894 tariff
debates, occupying 100 pages of the Congressional Record, "a classic case of economic
nonsense").
219. Stewart, supra note 204, at 266 (Table 12.1):
Positions taken in debate showed
Democrats: 73 in favor of the income tax, 11 moderates (position unclear)
and 18 opposed.
Republicans: 3 in favor, 10 moderates (position unclear), and 37 opposed.
220. Charles Hoffmann, The Depression of the Nineties, 16 1. OF ECON. HISTORY
137,138-39 (1956).
221. Offioe of the Oerk, U.S. House of Representative, Politiml Divisions of the House of Representatives, http://clerk.house.gov/hist.High/Congressional_History/partyDiv.html (last visited Mar.
29, 2004) (Republicans climbed from 34% of the seats to 68% of the seats).
222. Carl N. Degler, American Political Parties and the Rise of the City, 51 J. HIST.
41,46-50 (1963).
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With the Democratic collapse, opposition to the income tax
softened within the majority Republican Party between 1894 and
1913, when the modern income tax was finally adopted. Opponents of the income tax in 1898 argued that tax money was
needed immediately for the Spanish-American War and that
revenue needs could not await another Supreme Court challenge.223 Moderately conservative lawyers and economists
224
Charles Bullock of Harvard and R.A. Seligman of Columbia
became advocates. Progressive Republicans like Robert La Follette saw the income tax as bringing voters to the Republican
Party. President Theodore Roosevelt, who was sympathetic to
progressives on domestic issues, argued for the income tax: "The
man of great wealth," Roosevelt told Congress in 1906, "owes a
peculiar obligation to the State, because he derives special advantages from the mere existence of government." 225 In 1908, the
Republican candidate was Roosevelt's nominee, William Howard Taft, and both Taft and his Democratic opponent, again William Jennings Bryan, supported a progressive income tax. Both
candidates repudiated Pollock. 226
During the Taft administration in 1909, Congress proposed
the Sixteenth Amendment, which would allow an income tax
without apportionment among the states. President Howard Taft
and the conservative Republican leader, Nelson Aldrich, reached
a compromise. There would be no immediate individual income
tax in 1909 to force the Court to reconsider Pollock, but Congress
would adopt an immediate corporate income tax and ~ropose the
constitutional amendment for ratification by the states. 27
The Republicans changed their minds on the income tax. In
1894, Republicans with a position on the income tax had been
74% opposed. 228 In the 1909 proposals for an amendment, they
223. See Stewart, supra note 204, at 268.
224. Seligman opposed the 1894 income tax, then supported the 16'h Amendment.
He was, however, a "gradualist" and opposed the World War I's "excess profits" taxes.
W. Elliot Brownlee, Economists and the Formation of the Modern Tax System in the
United States: The World War I Crisis, in THE STATE AND ECONOMIC KNOWLEDGE: THE
AMERICAN AND BRITISH EXPERIENCES 401,405-10 (Mary 0. Furner & Barry E. Supple
eds. 1990).
225. Grover Cleveland, Sixth Annual Message (Dec. 6, 1887), in 3 STATE OF THE
UNION MESSAGES OF THE PRESIDENTS, 1790-1966, at 2213 (Fred israel ed.) (1966) (emphasis added).
226. RATNER, supra note 206, at 269 (1942).
227. WEISMAN, supra note 214, at 226-28. Taft claimed later that Aldrich had yielded
to him. !d.
228. See Stewart, supra note 204, at 266. In 1894, positions taken in debate showed
Democrats: 73 in favor of the income tax, 11 moderates (position unclear), and
18 opposed.
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were only 18% opposed, and in the 1913legislation, adopting the
income tax after the amendment was ratified, they were 21%
opposed. 229 Uncompromising, apocalyptic rhetoric also disappeared. Senator Aldridge described the income tax of 1894 as a
proposition advocated only by "Populists or by others who sympathized with them in a desire to redistribute the wealth of the
United States." In 1909 he said, "Not now, I think." 230 Senator
Jacob Gallinger, Republican of Maine, had declared on the Senate floor in 1894 that "proposed (income] tax is inequitable, inquisitorial, and sectional, and will in time of peace subject the
people to methods that were well nigh intolerable in time of
war." 231 By the time of the debates in 1913, however, he announced that
I never have brought myself to believe that an income tax is
an unjust tax, and to-day I cordially give my asset to the
proposition that, supplemental to the duties that are imposed
in the bill under consideration, an income tax is a very proper
..
232
mo d e of ra1smg revenue.

The Sixteenth Amendment was ratified in 42 of 48 states between 1909 and 1913. 233 In the end, even the wealthiest states
whose citizens would pay disproportionately more tax supported
the Amendment. 234 In 1913, after the Sixteenth Amendment had
been ratified, Congress enacted the modern income tax.
Both the 1894 and the 1913 individual income taxes were
modest, supplemental revenue raisers. Both had an exemption
level that allowed more than 99% of the population to avoid the
tax. 235 The 1913 tax collected only about 10% of federal revenue.
Federal alcohol and tobacco taxes were seven times more imporRepublicans 3 in favor, 10 moderates (position unclear), and 37 opposed.
229. !d. at 272: In 1909 positions taken in debate showed
Democrats: 61 in favor of the income tax, 8 moderates (position unclear), and 0
opposed.
Republicans: 13 in favor, 32 moderates (position unclear)
Democrats: 58 in favor of the income tax, 0 moderates (position unclear), and 1
opposed.
Republicans: 42 in favor, 5 moderates (position unclear), and 12 opposed.
230. 44 CONG. REC. 1536 (1909).
231. 26 CONG. REC. 3893 (1894).
232. 50 CONG. REC. 3813 (1913).
233. WEISMAN, supra note 214, at 250-65.
234. The wealthiest eight states would come to bear 75% of the income tax and all
but two of them would ratify the amendment. BUENKER, supra note 191, at 9-10, 291,
306, 179, 319, 310 (reporting that the ratifying states included New York, Ohio, Illinois,
California, New Jersey, and Maryland, but not Pennsylvania and Michigan). New York,
which was to bear 35% of the total tax, ratified in 1911. I d. at 10, 291.
235. BROWNLEE, supra note 211, at 38.
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tant in terms of yield, and customs were three times more important.236 When America entered World War I, however, the income tax exploded in importance. It became the major revenue
source for the war. With the impact of war on trade, the tariff
shrank.237 War finance, however, was not anticipated in 1913.
What had changed between 1894-95 and 1913 was that the income tax was no longer perceived as the front edge of the apocalypse. Pollock was decided in times of perceived class warfare.
When the panic disappeared, the country as a whole overwhelmingly endorsed the income tax.
3. Did the Sixteenth Amendment Affirm Pollock?

Professor Erik Jensen has argued that the reversal of Pollock by constitutional amendment rather than a reenactment of
the income tax must be understood as an affirmation that the income tax was a direct tax and that apportionment would be necessary absent an amendment. 238 That is not how the Sixteenth
Amendment was understood at the time.
First, the Sixteenth Amendment drew its political energy from
the widely held view that Pollock was wrongly decided. Oliver
Wendell Holmes argued that the comfortable classes in England
and the United States were frightened of socialism and that the
fright influenced their decisions in unconscious ways to take "sides
upon debatable and often burning questions." 239 An article in the
Harvard Law Review expressed faith that "the strong consensus of
opinion of the legal profession will work out the right": 240
When a court of last resort not only overrules in effect three
direct adjudications made by itself, but also refines away to

236. In 1916, the first year for which statistics are available, tariffs collected approximately $213 million, federal alcohol and tobacco collected over $335 million, and
the individual income tax collected almost $68 million, or about 10% of the federal total
revenue. Table Y264-279: Internal Revenue Collections 1863-1957, U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES, COLONIAL TIMES TO 1957,
at 712-13 (1980).
237. In 1918, for example, the income taxes generated $3 billion versus $600 million
in federal alcohol and tobacco taxes, and $180 million in tariffs. !d. Individual income tax
rates reached a peak of 77% in 1919. BROWNLEE, supra note 211, at 47-58, provides an
unsympathetic history of World War I's "soak the rich" income tax polices. WEISMAN,
supra note 214, at 344-46, is more sympathetic.
238. Jensen, supra note 2, at 1119.
239. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Pmh of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457,467-68
(1897).
240. Francis R. Jones, Pollock v. Farmers' Loan and Trust Company, 9 HARV. L.
REV. 198, 198 (1895-1896) (arguing that a tax on income from real property might be a
tax on property economically, but it was not a direct tax on the property).
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the vanishing point two other of its decisions, and thereby
cripples an important and necessary power and function of a
coordinate branch of the government, and delivers an opinion
in which is laid down a doctrine that is contrary to what has
been accepted as law for nearly one hundred years, it is neither improper nor unprofessional carefully and earnestly to
scrutinize that decision and the authorities and reasons upon
which it is founded. 241

Senator Joseph Bailey of Texas argued in the debate over the
Sixteenth Amendment that "an overwhelming majority of the
best legal opinion in this Republic believes that [Pollock] was erroneous. "24 "No decision ... has been so universally condemned
or its soundness so generally questioned," said Cordell Hull of
Tennessee (later Secretary of State )_2 43
Some of the criticism was sharper. Pollock's five-man majority consisted of "nullifying judges" who ou£ht to be impeached, wrote the former governor of Oregon. 2 Cordell Hull
called Pollock a "palpably erroneous decision stripping a coordinate bod~ of the Government of one its strong arms of power
and duty." 45 Justice John Harlan, who had dissented from the
case, described Pollock as a "decision [that] will become as hateful with the American people as the Dred Scott case." 246
From the beginning, the income tax movement followed
two parallel tracks, one to challenge the Court and force it to retreat, and the other to respect the Court as an institution by
seeking a constitutional amendment. Which fork to take represented simply a matter of tactics within a unified campaign to defeat Pollock. Theodore Roosevelt's State of the Union address
in 1906 said that Pollock might be overruled, but that a constitutional amendment would follow if it were not:
As the law now stands it is undoubtedly difficult to devise a
national income tax which shall be constitutional. But

241. Id.; see also Edward Whitney, The Income Tax and the Constitution, 20 HARV.
L. REV. 280, 296 (1907) (saying that the Court had weakened the confidence of the people in the judiciary and made the Constitution plastic).
242. 44 CONG. REC. 1351 (1909).
243. 44 CONG. REC. 534 (1909) (Cordell Hull (Dem., Tenn.)).
244. Sylvester Pennoyer, The Income Tax Decision and the Power of the Supreme
Court to Nullify Act of Congress, 29 AM. L. REv. 550,558 (1895).
245. MEMOIRS OF CORDELL HULL, supra note 200, at 59 (1948).
246. Letter from Justice Harlan to His Sons (May 24, 1895), quoted in David Farrell,
Justice Harlan's Dissent in the Pollock Case, 24 S. CAL. L. REV. 175, 180 (1951); accord,
EDWIN R.A. SELIGMAN, THE INCOME TAX: A STUDY OF THE HISTORY, THEORY AND
PRACTICE OF INCOME TAXATION AT HOME AND ABROAD 589-90 (2d ed. 1914).
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whether is absolutely impossible is another question and if
possible it is certainly desirable .... The question is undoubtedly very intricate, delicate and troublesome. The decision of
the court was only reached by one majority .... Nevertheless,
the difficulty evidently felt by the court as a whole in coming
to a conclusion, when considered with all the prior decisions
on the subject, may indicate the possibility of devising a constitutional income-tax law which substantially accomplishes
the results aimed at ... but if this fails, there will ultimately be
247
no alternative to a constitutional amendment.

Cordell Hull told the House of Representatives that it was the
duty of Congress "to invoke every remedy at its command for
the restoration of that lost [taxing] power," including both areenactment of an income tax and an amendment. 248 His assessment after the fact was the "the two proposals (for amendment
and for challenging the Supreme Court] contributed to the success of each other. "249
The decision to pursue a constitutional amendment rather
than pass an income tax bill inviting the Court to reconsider Pollock arose from respect for the Supreme Court as an institution, but
not from respect for Pollock. Roosevelt, while energetically opposing Pollock as law and as policy, said nonetheless that Pollock "is
the law of the land, and of course accepted as such and loyally
obeyed by all good citizens."250 President Taft's influence ultimately
decided the tactical course, and his choice was defended as a matter
of respect for the Supreme Court. Taft's tax package included both
an immediate income tax on corporations and a constitutional
amendment facilitating an income tax on individuals:
I prefer an income tax, but the truth is that I am afraid of the
discussion which will follow and the criticism which will ensue
if there is another serious division in the Supreme Court on
the subject of the income tax. Nothing has ever injured the
prestige of the Supreme Court more than [Pollock] and I
247. Theodore Roosevelt, Sixth Annual Message, (Dec. 3, 1906), 3 STATE OF THE
UNION MESSAGES OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES at 2214-15 (Fred Israel
ed.) (1966); see also Theodore Roosevelt, Seventh Annual Message, (Dec. 3, 1907), 3
STATE OF THE UNION MESSAGES OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES at 2253
(Fred Israel ed.) (1966) ("Nevertheless a graduated income tax of the proper type would
be a desirable feature of Federal taxation, and it is hoped that one may be devised which
the Supreme Court will declare constitutional.").
248. 44 CONG. REC. 534 (1909) (emphasis added).
249. MEMOIRS OF CORDELL HULL, supra note 200, at 60.
250. Theodore Roosevelt, Sixth Annual Message (Dec. 3, 1906), 3 STATE OF THE
UNION MESSAGES OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES at 2215 (Fred Israel ed.)
(1966).
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think many of the most violent advocates of the income tax
will be glad of the substitution [of a corporation tax] for same
reason. I am going to push the Constitutional Amendment,
which will admit an income tax without question, but I am
afraid of it without such an amendment. 251

In the same vein, Taft wrote that "I am really in favor of an income tax, but I fear the Court would follow the Pollock case and
declare it unconstitutional, and I do not desire that." 252
The Senate Finance Committee decided that "it would be indelicate, at least, for the Congress of the United States to pass another measure and ask the Supreme Court to pass upon it, when
they had already passed upon the proposition." 253 Edward Whitney argued in the Harvard Law Review that Pollock had weakened the confidence of the people in the judiciary and made the
"Constitution plastic on all points," but that a second overruling
would further undermine the Court, "even to restore the Constitution as originally defined. " 254 Moreover, if the Court refused to
distinguish or overrule Pollock and invalidated the income tax
again, the public outrage would threaten the institution as a
whole. In the end, the Congress decided not to challenge the authority or majesty of the Supreme Court, even as it reversed Pollock's core holding that an unapportioned income tax was unconstitutional. The states that ratified the Sixteenth Amendment did
not believe that they were affirming Pollock. In New Jersey, for
example, Governor Woodrow Wilson told the state assembly that
Pollock was based on "erroneous economic reasoning." 255
The Sixteenth Amendment came to bury Pollock, not to
praise it.
CONCLUSION: TIME TO SIGN THE DEATH
CERTIFICATE
Pollock was not completely overruled by the rapid judicial
expansion of the definition of "excise tax." The expansion of
"excise" did allow assaults on wealth in the form of the corpo-

251. Letter from Archibald Taft to Clara Taft (July 1, 1909), in TAFf AND
ROOSEVELT at 134 (Archie Butted., 1930).
252. Letter from William Howard Taft to Edward Colston (June 24, 1909), quoted in
Majorie Kornhauser, Corporate Regulation and the Origins of the Corporate Income Tax,
66 IND. L. J. 53,98 n. 197 (1990).
253. 44 CoNG. REC. 3936 (1909) (Senator Frank P. Flint (Rep. Calif.)).
254. Whitney, supra note 241, at 289.
255. Quoted in WEISMAN, supra note 214, at 264.
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rate income tax, the estate tax, and the stock transfer tax. The
Supreme Court found that every tax that came before it in the
twenty years after Pollock was an excise tax. Given its rapid expansion from its modest core, "excise" should be understood as
a malleable concept that a Court can and should use to avoid
apportionment. Similarly, Pollock was not technically overruled
by the Sixteenth Amendment, which merely authorized an income tax? 56 Still, the income tax was the last important tax at issue. In the twenty years after the decision, the Court stripped
Pollock of any impact beyond its facts, and the Sixteenth
Amendment reversed the case on its facts. The people thought
they were overruling Pollock in its last redoubt. "Income" is also
a malleable concept that the Court can use to avoid apportionment. Manipulation of the terms "excise," "duty," and "income"
to avoid apportionment might be legal fictions, if the terms are
held to their original meaning, but legal fictions can be sufficient
tools for reaching the right result. This strategy could go on indefinitely, always enabling us to distinguish Pollock to avoid apportionment no matter what tax is under consideration.
Indeed, not only can the courts avoid apportionment by
manipulative expansion of such terms as "excise" and "income,"
but they have a duty to do so. Apportionment is a silly and debilitating requirement when the tax base is uneven. There is no
justification for making poorer states pay higher rates and no
justification in incapacitating taxes needed to pay war debts or
for any other purpose. No court should ever again veto any federal tax by imposing the apportionment requirement, now that
the original purpose of apportionment, discouragement of slavery, has no remaining life. Pollock is a terrible example of bad
judicial behavior. Today it serves mainly as a precedent to avoid.
As Justice Harlan called it, it is the Dred Scott of tax.
Since Pollock should never be followed again, it is time to
reverse it in full and to return to the case law following Hylton,
which preceded Pollock. Hylton got it right: a tax that cannot
reasonably or naturally be apportioned is not a direct tax because apportionment is the defining characteristic of direct tax.
Professor Thomas Reed Powell wrote that the public understood
the Sixteenth Amendment to be a recall of the Pollock decision
and a restoration of what had gone before. 257 Pollock has been
256. Indeed, in Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920), the Court held that a stock
dividend was not income and thus presumed, without serious discussion of the issue, that
Pollock would require it to be apportioned.
257. Thomas Reed Powell, Srock Dividends, Direct Taxes and the Sixteenth Amend-
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beaten back by the Court, by the other two branches of the federal government, and by the states that ratified the Sixteenth
Amendment. Apportionment is too stupid a requirement ever to
be applied again.

ment, 20 COLUM. L. REV. 536,538 (1920).
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